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STATUTES OF LIMITATION IN TAX FRAUD

BASIC POLICIES AND CIRCUMVENTION
By ALLEN E. ERTEL*

For efficient and effective tax collection, the federal income tax
system utilizes a voluntary self-assessment system which depends
on the truth of the statements and figures rendered by the taxpayer
in his return to the government.' To insure the taxpayer's honesty
and to overcome his distaste for tax payment, the government has
an arsenal of weapons to employ if and when the Internal Revenue
Service 2 discovers an "evader."
The primary criminal weapon in the Internal Revenue Code is
section 7201 which provides for a fine not to exceed $10,000 and/or
imprisonment not to exceed five years of "Any person who willfully
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax . . . or the pay-3 Secondary weapons include section 7203,
ment thereof ....

which provides for a fine not to exceed $10,000 and/or imprisonment not to exceed one year of "any person required . . . to pay
any ... tax... to make a return, keep any records, or supply any
4
" to do the foregoing; section
information, who willfully fails ...

7206, which provides for a fine not to exceed $5,000 and/or imprisonment not to exceed three years of any person who willfully
makes any false statement, document or return accompanied by a
declaration that it is made under penalties of perjury; 5 and section
7207 which provides for a fine not to exceed $1,000 and/or imprisonment not to exceed one year of "Any person who willfully delivers or discloses" to the IRS "any list, return, account, statement,
or other document known by him to be fraudulent or to be false as
to any material matter."
A.B., 1958, Dartmouth College; M.S., 1959, Thayer School of -Engineering and the Amos Tuck School of Business Administration; LL.B., 1965,
Yale Law School; associated with Candor, Youngman, Gibson and Gault,
Williamsport, Pennsylvania.
1. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
2. Hereinafter referred to as the IRS.
3.

INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7201 (felony).

4.
5.
6.

INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7203 (misdemeanor).
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7206 (felony).
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7207 (felony).
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The Internal Revenue Code also contains civil sanctions which
consist of additions to the taxes due. These civil sanctions may be
imposed in addition to the criminal penalties of the Code.7 Section
6653,8 the severest of the civil sanctions, provides for the addition
of fifty per cent to any tax due even though only a small segment
of the tax owed was fraudulently evaded. This section covers the
same conduct as condemned by section 72011 since the penalty is
added if "any part of an underpayment . . . of tax required to be

shown on a return is due to fraud."' 0 Section 665111 provides for
an addition of five per cent per month of the tax due, up to twentyfive per cent of the tax due if the taxpayer willfully neglects to
file a return.
Even though it may appear from this survey of the Internal
Revenue Code that these sanctions are to be the exclusive means
to implement and protect the tax laws from evaders, a selected
number of the general criminal statutes of the United States Code
have been employed by the IRS. Thus, the perjury, 12 false statement," and conspiracy 14 statutes have been successfully utilized by
the government.' 5
The IRS normally has three years to make an assessment
Howagainst the taxpayer; otherwise the assessment is barred.'
ever, an exception to this provision permits the IRS to assess the
taxpayer at any time if fraud is involved.' T Thus, it is not uncommon for the government, relying on this exception, to assess for tax
years which are ten to fifteen years from the time of the assessment notice.' s By the time the taxpayer's liability has been determined by the tax court, a period of fifteen to twenty years
may have elapsed from the year of the alleged evasion.
Criminal tax fraud, unlike civil tax fraud, is subject to a six
year statute of limitations which begins to run from the time the
7. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
8. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6653 (hereafter referred to as civil tax
fraud).
9. See, Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964).
10. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6653.
11. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6651.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1964).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
15. See, e.g., Levin v. United States, 5 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1925) (perjury); Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1955) (false statements); Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960) (conspiracy).
16. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6501(a).
17. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6501(c).
18. See, e.g., Eugene Richardson, 16 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 518 (1957)
(12 years); Albert Axler, 15 CCH TAX CT. MEm. 262 (1956) (11 years);
Penn Ohio Steel Corp., 23 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 719 (1964) (10 years);
Patsy F. DiZenso, 23 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 677 (1964) (12 years).

Fall 1966]

STATUTES OF LIMITATION

offense is "committed."' 19 Because of the difficulty in determining
when the offense is "committed" and the overlap of the above sections of the criminal code, 20 the bar of this statute of limitations is
easily avoided by the IRS. For example, the IRS can subpoena a
taxpayer to an administrative conference at any time and question
him concerning his civil tax liability. If the taxpayer answers,
either because he is denied the fifth amendment privilege against
self incrimination as the statute of limitations on criminal tax fraud
has run and he is not subject to criminal punishment or merely
because he feels the necessity to cooperate, this act can subject
him to criminal prosecution for the above crimes. 21 Since the
statute of limitations starts running for these crimes from the
time of this statement, it is readily apparent that the government
can extend the length of time for prosecution indefinitely. Thus,
criminal prosecutions have been brought up to sixteen years after
the year of the alleged evasion. 22 In reality, just as civil tax fraud
does not have any statute of limitations, neither does criminal tax
fraud because of the ability of the government to penetrate the bar
of the six year criminal statute of limitations. Later in this article,
consideration will be given to the wisdom of not having a civil tax
fraud statute of limitations and to the defeat of the policies embraced in the criminal tax fraud statute of limitations. First it is
necessary to consider the overlap in definition and purposes of civil
and criminal tax fraud.
SImILARrrIES BETwEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL

TAx

FRAUD

Criminal tax fraud is composed of three elements: willfulness, 23 an affirmative fraudulent act 24 and a substantial deficiency. 25 Most commentators agree that the issue of fraud in the
civil fraud statute has the same elements as section 7201 except
that the degree of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, which is required to convict under section 7201 is greater than for a finding of
civil fraud under section 6653, which requires only "clear and convincing" evidence. 2 In Helvering v. Mitchell,2 the Supreme Court
19. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 6531.
20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1001, 1621 (1964).
21. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 18; United States v. Beacon Brass
Co., 344 U.S. 43 (1952).
22. See United States v. Mousley, 194 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
23. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7201; Holland v. United States, 348 U.S.
121, 139 (1954).
24. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
25. See, e.g., Willingham v. United States, 289 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1961).
26. E.g., Gilman, Current Problems in Criminal Tax Fraud, 33 TAXES
749 (1963).
27. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
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held that acquittal of criminal tax fraud did not collaterally estop
the government from assessing civil fraud penalties in a subsequent
case because of the higher standard of proof required by the government in the criminal case. In the recent case of Tomlinson v.
Lefkowitz, 2 however, the Fifth Circuit applied the collateral estoppel doctrine against a taxpayer who was criminally convicted
and who subsequently denied fraud in a suit by the government for
the civil penalties. Since the government had met the higher standard of proof required in the criminal case, the taxpayer was estopped from contesting the fraud issue in the civil case. Subsequently, a district court refused to follow the Fifth Circuit's reasoning on the theory that the issues were not identical.29 Although
the district court concluded there was a difference between proving
"willfully attempting to evade or defeat the tax" and the civil test
of whether the deficiency is "due to fraud," the court did not explain the distinction. 30 Nevertheless, the tax court, which previously held that the criminal tax fraud conviction was only evidence
of fraud and not conclusive,
has reversed its position and now fol31
lows the Fifth Circuit.

Under the Fifth Circuit's holding the only issue to be contested
in a civil case is the size of the deficiency,3 2 since in the criminal case
the government only has to prove a substantial deficiency rather
than the exact amount. 33 In the civil case, an exact figure must be
established to determine the amount owed by the taxpayer.
In Helvering v. Mitchell the Court suggested a difference in
purpose between sections 7201 and 6653(b). The Court concluded
that section 7201 is punitive while section 6653 (b) is to protect the
revenue and to reimburse the government for the expense of the
fraud investigation and loss from the fraud.3 4 It should be noted,
however, that the purpose of section 7201 is also to protect the
revenue by punishing violators in order to deter others from evading taxes.3 5 Thus the criminal sanction serves the same purpose of
protecting the revenue as does the civil. Having the civil sanction,
however, serves the additional purpose of reimbursing the government.,
28. 334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964).
29. Cobbs v. United States, 64-2 USTC 9628 (N.D. Ala. 1964).
30. Ibid.
31. See John Casner, Jr., 23 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 1683 (1964); John H.
Maxwell, 23 CCH TAX CT. MEMv. 1867 (1964) (dictum).
32. Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964).
33. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 517-18 (1942); United
States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513 (1942).
34. 303 U.S. 391, 405 (1938).
35. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 142 (1954); Holland v.
United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
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Unless reimbursement is of such weight to override the basic
policies of the statute of limitations, or the statute of limitations
in criminal tax fraud serves a different function than in the civil
area, there is a basic inconsistency in having enacted a criminal
statute of limitations and not a civil one. The anomaly is even
more striking since the standard of proof for the government is
less exacting in civil than in criminal fraud cases. The IRS has
until eternity to prosecute the offense requiring less proof but
only six years, in theory, to convict for criminal tax fraud requiring the higher standard of proof.
PURPOSES OF STATUTES OF LIMITATION

The considerations embodied in statutes of limitation can be
separated into three classes: policies which are common to both the
criminal and civil law, purposes which are relevant only to civil
law, and those which are usually pertinent only to the criminal law.
The policies which are not normally common to both areas of the
law reflect the differences in functions and purposes between the
civil and criminal law. Because of the similarities in criminal and
civil tax fraud, this divergence of function and purpose does not
necessarily follow. Policies that normally would only apply to the
criminal law may be highly relevant to civil tax fraud as well.
Also, due to the peculiarities of criminal tax fraud, policies which
may be very important in other criminal cases may be less applicable to criminal tax fraud.
Since neither the courts nor the legislature have discussed the
purpose of the six year criminal tax fraud statute of limitations nor
the reason for not enacting one for civil tax fraud, other areas of
law must be examined to determine the policies embodied in
them. Having determined the general policies embodied in statutes
of limitation, the applicability of these policies to tax fraud can be
examined to determine whether a civil tax fraud statute of limitations is desirable and whether the criminal statute of limitations is
worth protecting from IRS circumvention.
Fairness
The primary consideration underlying such legislation in both
the civil and criminal areas is undoubtedly one of fairness to defendants. It is unfair to make a person defend his liberty or property after an extended period of time since his evidence will either
have deteriorated or been destroyed. Witnesses die, records are
lost, events are forgotten. 6
36. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S.
342, 349 (1944).
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Because the plaintiff or prosecutor has control of the suit and
exclusive knowledge as to whether the action will be brought, he
can preserve his evidence while the defendant may not know that
an action is contemplated. Even if the defendant knows of a contemplated action, he may not know the facts or theory upon which
the prosecutor or plaintiff will base his case. Thus, although the
defendant's evidence is preservable, the defendant will not know
what evidence to keep. When the claim is invalid, the chances that
a person may be convicted or suffer judgment against himself are
greatly increased with the passage of time. When the claim is
valid, mitigating circumstances or evidence as to the amount of
damages might be unavailable to the defendant. Consequently, in
many cases, delay in time will give an advantage to the prosecutor
or plaintiff. Moreover, the plaintiff or prosecutor will have greater
advantage if he does not have to rely upon memory and the defendant must.
In both civil and criminal tax fraud, the government usually
emphasizes facts and figures in constructing its caseA7 These items
are supported primarily by written evidence. For example, the
government always uses the defendant's tax returns, which the
government has within its control and can preserve for an action at
any time. Also, in many cases the IRS utilizes bank records,38 other
people's tax returns or information returns, 9 and various mathematical estimates. 40 As a result, the government is not necessarily
handicapped in prosecuting a tax fraud case after a long period of
time. The fact that the 'government does not have a difficult problem in maintaining its evidence in excellent condition gives it an
added advantage by delaying its case.
The government could obtain this advantage by gathering its
information early and sitting on it. However, even if the government does not accumulate its evidence and wait, it is likely to receive some benefit by delay because the bank records, tax forms,
information returns or other people's returns are available to the
government for a considerable period of time after the alleged evasion; and the evidence will not deteriorate or be destroyed. On the
other hand, in tax fraud cases the defendant must rely upon oral
testimony to a greater extent than need the government. To make
his defense, the taxpayer's witnesses must be both available and
able to remember past events.
37.

See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 142 (1954); Holland v.

United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
38. Schmidt, Reconstruction of Income, 18 TAx L. REV. 231 (1962).
39. Spencer, Proof of Income Tax Fraud, 2 TAx L. REv. 451 (1947).
40. See, e.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
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For example, the net worth method provides the IRS with a
means of creating a prima facie case merely by presenting a set of
figures. In the typical net worth prosecution the IRS attempts
to establish the net worth for the taxpayer's assets at the beginning
of a given year. The government then attempts to prove an increase in taxpayer's net assets for each succeeding year by calculating the net cost of his assets at the end of the year and subtracting
the sum for the beginning. To this calculated increase in net
assets is added the taxpayer's nondeductible expenses for each
year. If this figure is substantially greater than the reported taxable income, the IRS claims the excess as unreported taxable income. It also asks the jury to infer willfulness from this.41
The burden then rests on the taxpayer to show that there was
not a deficiency or, if there was a deficiency, that it was not a
result of a bad motive, i.e., that it was a good faith mistake. In
either case the defendant must rely upon memory or his records
either to explain the deficiency or the reason for the good faith mistake. The defendant who has no knowledge of the possible prosecution may have destroyed his records in accordance with his
normal business policy. Although destruction of records is not
independent proof of fraud, 42 the taxpayer may be hard-pressed
for evidence to defeat the Commissioner's case without them. Even
if the defendant attempts to disprove the charge by establishing
another set of figures with written documents which substantiate
his income tax return, he might have to prove the validity of
these documents by testimony.
If the defendant is contesting the issue of willfulness, a subjective mental intent, it is very doubtful that he could have any real
evidence to produce. Instead, he would probably have to depend
upon his memory and testimony and that of his accountant, provided he is still available, to prove his lack of intent at the time of
the alleged events. In this situation the government relies on inferences from its documentary evidence, but the defendant must
rely on memory.
In the civil case an additional problem exists in determining
the deficiency. The government makes separate tax compilations
where there are criminal and civil phases of the same case, and
such computations almost invariably differ even though the same
theory of proof is utilized in each instance. Evidence which is
otherwise admissible but is of doubtful value or is controversial in
nature is usually eliminated from the criminal prosecution in which
41. Ibid.; Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
42. S.Snyder, 14 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 1126 (1955); Frank J. Moore, 37
B. T. A. 378 (1938).
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the crime must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. This
evidence, which would becloud the issue, is not presented under the
rationale that it would unduly complicate the criminal trial and
confuse the jury. Conversely, to inflate the deficiency and penalties, the government will include additional items- whether controversial, technical or of doubtful evidentiary value- in the civil
phase of the case where the weight of its burden of proof as to the
fraud issue is less.

43

Before Lefkowitz, if there was a criminal conviction for fraud,
this conviction could be introduced as evidence to establish civil
fraud. 44 Undoubtedly this evidence would be highly persuasive so
that the problem of beclouding the fraud issue was not pressing.
Moreover, once the government had carried its burden in proving
fraud, the burden would shift to the taxpayer to disprove the correctness of the deficiency asserted by the Commissioner. 45 Thus,
in the civil case, not only did the defendant normally need to provide additional evidence to that presented in the criminal case to
rebut these doubtful and controversial items asserted by the Commissioner, but he also had the burden to disprove the correctness
of the deficiency.
However, under the Lefkowitz doctrine, the taxpayer will be
faced with a still more difficult situation. Since this doctrine removes the fraud element from the civil case and the only issue at
trial is the deficiency, the government need not worry about its
evidence confusing the trier of fact as to fraud. In essence, the
proceeding is identical to a normal assessment situation where the
Commissioner receives the presumption of correctness throughout.46

Thus it seems logical that the government will present

every conceivable item, regardless of how controversial, technical
or doubtful it is, to inflate the deficiency. Since in the later trial
the taxpayer will be required to produce more and better evidence to rebut the government's case, the destruction of defendant's
records and the loss of memory will make the defense more difficult.
If there is a criminal phase of the case, it may be argued that
the defendant will be put on notice to preserve his evidence once
this phase is begun. Naturally most defendants would keep all of
their records once the case is begun, but if the evidence is in someone else's mind or possession, it is difficult to preserve. Moreover,
43. Schmidt, supra note 38.
See, e.g., Estate of Stater, 21 CCH

TAX CT. MEM. 1355 (1962).
Bryan v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1954); J. T. Benn,
22 TAX CT. ME . 707 (1963).
46. See, e.g., Gould v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 686 (4th Cir. 1948);
Estate of Stater, 21 CCH TAX CT. Mm. 1355 (1962).

44.
45.
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this presumes that the defendant knows what items the government
is going to contest in the civil case. Obviously, the same items or
amounts that were involved in the criminal will be involved in the
civil phase, but often the government includes additional amounts
in the civil case. If the case is in the tax court, where there are no
discovery rules, the defendant may not have knowledge of these
additional items until the civil case is begun. 47 Thus, even if there
is a means to preserve his proof by retaining records and obtaining
written depositions, the lack of knowledge effectively hampers the
defendant's preserving this proof.
Stale Claims
Another factor underlying the statute of limitations may be
the possible ineffectiveness of the courts when required to rely
upon stale evidence and a desire to relieve the courts of the burden
of adjudicating inconsequential or tenuous claims. Mr. Justice
Jackson conceived of the statutes of limitation as pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, 48 but Judge
Learned Hand disputed the validity of this argument. His view
was that the court's function was to decide hard questions, and
they should not abdicate this responsibility. 49 If Justice Jackson
meant that statutes of limitation were necessary to protect the
judicial process from possibly deciding cases unjustly and not to
save the court work, this would seem to be a valid purpose. However, the notion of relieving the courts of deciding inconsequential
or tenuous claims makes a basically invalid assumption that all
claims not promptly litigated are tenuous or insubstantial. Fear of
the courts, a distaste for litigation, or attempts to settle claims
outside of court result in the delay of many substantial claims.
Basically, the contrast between Justice Jackson's approach and
Judge Hand's reflects their ideas of the court's role in society.
Justice Jackson's view appears to be that the court's decision making process should be used sparingly and to render judgments only
when it has very reliable evidence on which to decide; otherwise
the status quo should not be disturbed. Carrying the assumptions
of Justice Jackson one step further, since the plaintiff or prosecutor
is the one who wishes to change the status quo and invocation of
the judicial process is within his control, he should not be allowed
to invoke the judicial process after his long period of inaction, es47. See, Bennion, Equivalents of Pre-Trial Discovery and Court Suggested Settlements: The Licavoil Case, 1958 So. CAL. Tax Inst. 405.
48. Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
49. United States v. Curtiss Aeroplane Co., 147 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir.
1945).
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pecially since, in the usual situation, stale evidence is not very
trustworthy and its use increases the possibility that the court will
make an incorrect decision.
Judge Hand's view, however, appears to be that a court's function is to render an authoritative decision on cases brought before it
and settle the dispute for the parties, regardless of the age of the
evidence. Undoubtedly he would agree that the court in weighing
the evidence should take into account the time factor along with
the normal presumptions and burden of proof.
It is difficult to agree with this approach since the entire balance of the trial is upset by a long delay in bringing suit. The presumptions that are normally encountered in a trial are to establish
some balance between the adversaries, based on our ideas of fair
proof allocation and the accessibility of this proof to these parties.
Normally, inferences are drawn from the fact that certain evidence
was not presented in court, especially in civil cases. The assumption is that the party required to present this evidence would do so
if it existed; if the person's theory is correct, certain evidence
would exist and be presented. Even in a criminal trial where inferences are not to be drawn from the defendant's failure to produce evidence, if the prosecutor's evidence is uncontroverted, it
certainly carries much more weight than if there is factual evidence to dispute it. In essence, with the long delayed trial, not
only does the evidence which is usually presented become distorted, but the inferences which can be drawn from the lack of
evidence become highly ambiguous. Even if the trial is held immediately after the alleged events, the failure to produce evidence may
be ambiguous because (1) the fact is true, thus there isn't any evidence to rebut it or (2) even if the fact is untrue, the defendant
cannot produce the evidence to disprove it because of possible self
incrimination, inability to locate witnesses, uncooperativeness of
witnesses, etc. The assumption is that the first inference is more
likely than not. But after a long delay between the alleged events
and the trial, this inference becomes much less logical. When the
trier of fact considers the effect upon the evidence of the lapse of
time, there is no criteria by which to judge whether one inference
is more logical than the other; the decision becomes conjectural.
Tax fraud cases are subject to this infirmity. Even if tax fraud
cases are litigated promptly, they are very susceptible to being incorrectly decided because of the hazards and pitfalls of indirect
methods of proof.50 Undoubtedly, one of the reasons that the courts
50.

Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
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require a substantial deficiency to convict for criminal tax fraud"
is because they recognize the possibility of error when reconstructing the events concerning tax fraud. The requirement of a large
deficiency hedges against error because it minimizes the probability
of a small mistake in figures and it supports the inference that the
deficiency was due to willfulness.
The court's problem as to a deficiency is much more difficult in
the civil case because each item must be considered to reach the
exact amount of the tax deficiency. Here the courts are much more
likely to err, especially when only a limited amount of evidence is
presented. Of course, this same problem is presented to the courts
whenever a deficiency is to be determined, but it becomes more
difficult to reconstruct this figure on old, incomplete evidence.
Mental Tranquillity and Stability of Society
Another consideration, closely related to the idea of fairness, is
the assurance of the offender's mental tranquillity following a certain period of time.52 In time, even the person guilty of having
committed a crime or civil offense should be able to conduct his
personal and business affairs in a normal manner without fear of
disruption.
The criminal statute allows a person who has rehabilitated
himself to know that he will not be lifted from society by a successful criminal prosecution for crimes long past. 53

This policy

acknowledges that there is no social utility in punishing one who
has reformed and has remained free of criminal acts for a length of
time. Of course, the statute of limitations does not protect the individual from being singled out and degraded by the government's bringing a prosecution for a crime barred by the statute.
This practice does not seem likely in the great majority of cases,
since the government very likely will not prosecute if there is
no chance of success.
Conversely, it can be argued that statutes of limitation may
have an effect opposite that of self rehabilitation. A person who
successfully escapes punishment for a crime by the bar of the statute of limitations may be encouraged to repeat it.
Complementary to the self rehabilitation concept is the notion
that a statute of limitations increases stability in society. If a
person is removed from society by a criminal prosecution, the resulting disruption affects everyone with whom he has contact, es51. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1942); Willingham v.
United States, 289 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1961).
52. See Callahan, Statutes of Limitation-Background, 16 OHIo ST.
L. J. 130 (1955).
53. See 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 367 (10th ed. 1918).
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pecially his family, friends and creditors. When a statute of limitations is established, it embodies the judgment that the conviction
after the statute of limitations has run is not worth the trouble
caused by this disruption, particularly since the person has not
continued to violate the law and has been a law-abiding citizen for
this period of time.
Generally, the persons prosecuted for tax fraud are those one
thinks of as respectable law-abiding citizens. 54 The criminal statute
of limitations for tax fraud enables these persons to rehabilitate
themselves and rest secure in the knowledge that they will not be
pulled from society by a criminal prosecution although they have
committed a crime. Furthermore, if the person has rehabilitated
himself and is paying his share of taxes now, the amount of
revenue contributed by this person during the time he has been
rehabilitated and in the future may greatly exceed the amount
evaded. Given the ultimate aim of collecting the maximum amount
of tax, the government, in many cases, will receive more financial
benefit by having the truly rehabilitated person remain in society
as a producing individual than by confining him.
Logically this argument could be extended so as to preclude all
prosecutions. The individual may rehabilitate himself and become
"honest" immediately after his evasion. Obviously a balance must
be struck. Some people necessarily must be prosecuted or everyone
would evade tax payments; 55 but prosecution should not be utilized
against people who have proved themselves to be rehabilitated.
Rehabilitation is one of the ultimate aims of our criminal law.56
If it has been successfully accomplished without state intervention,
it should be rewarded.
In a civil tax fraud action, mental tranquillity and stability in
society are not a very persuasive set of reasons for a statute of limitations. But the statute does permit a taxpayer to plan his business
affairs without having to provide a large contingency fund for a
cause of action which is long past. Payment of a deficiency plus a
penalty and interest could destroy a businessman. , The threat of
such a judgment would require him to maintain a fund of liquid
assets which might be an inefficient allocation of those assets.
Additionally, since the government is bringing the lawsuit and
most non-legally oriented citizens may not be able to distinguish
criminal from civil actions, some of the social stigma that normally
attaches to a criminal prosecution may attach to the civil. This
54.
55.
56.
1958).

See, e.g., Wisley v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1950).
BALEER, TAx FRAUD AND EVASION § 1.8 (3d ed. 1963).
HALL & GLUECK, CRIMINAL LAW AND ENFORCEMENT, 19-23 (2d ed.
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stigmatization may and probably will harm, to a great extent, a
person's reputation, especially those in the professions.
Settlement of Property Rights
Periods of limitations also eliminate many disruptive effects
that unsettled claims have on commercial intercourse. Accordingly,
statutes of limitations in many areas "quiet title" so that property
can be transferred with certainty in business dealings.5 7 A related
purpose is served by short non-claim statutes in the administration of decedents' estates.58 When the statutory provisions which
allow the government to pursue assets of an evader into the hands
of a transferee 9 are combined with the civil tax fraud statute, 0
the disruptive effect to commercial transactions is readily apparent. The statute of limitations under the transfer provisions is
tied to the statute of limitations for assessments.6 ' Consequently, if the transferor committed tax fraud, there is no time after
which the government is precluded from an action against the
transferee. Furthermore, the government can pursue these assets
from one transferee to another so long as they are traceable, since
the statute of limitations against a subsequent transferee hinges
62
on the expiration of the statute of limitations against the evader.
This, in effect, means the government can sue him at any time.
The tracing of assets, when there is a living transferor, is not as
probable as when a decedent's estate as transferor is involved.
Prior to tracing assets the IRS must pursue the transferor if he is
68
solvent and only if he is insolvent can it pursue the transferee.
Additionally, the IRS must prove a fraudulent transfer to the
transferee. These requirements provide some protection for a
transferee of a living transferor, but an heir of an alleged evader is
virtually defenseless. Once the distribution of the estate is complete, it is insolvent. This fulfills the first requirement. Furthermore, proof of a fraudulent transfer is no problem since, by defini64
tion, a transfer which renders a person insolvent is fraudulent.
Thus, the government, in spite of state statutes prescribing the time
and procedure for presenting claims against decedent's estate, has
been able to pursue assets into the hands of legatees even after
57.
58.

1 WOOD, LIMITATIONS § 10 (1916).
See, e.g., CAL. PROBATE CODE § 702 (maximum of six months

allowed).
59. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6901.
60. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6653.
61. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6901(c).
62. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6901(a) (2).
63. See, e.g., Tena N. DeSalvo, 14 CCH TAX CT. M m. 249 (1955).
64. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4.
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the administrator dis-

A large assessment can disrupt any transferee's financial
status long after the transfer has been made and the transferee has
structured his family life and business affairs around the possession
of these assets. If the government could pursue these assets for a
limited time only, in most cases, the transferee would not have had
time to rely on the continued possession of them. To enable the
government to sue for their return after the transferee has had
possession for a long time can and probably does create havoc.
The possibility of tax fraud prosecution against decedents' estates
at any time hampers the expeditious settling of estates. Furthermore, the case is difficult to defend because the best witness, the
decedent, is dead.
PURPOSES

OF STATUTES OF LIMITATION IN CRIMINAL LAW

Control of Public Officials
The requirement of rapid prosecution of crimes within the
period of limitations places a check on the arbitrary action of public
officials.66
Government administrators cannot dredge up old
crimes to prosecute and harass individuals. An underlying assumption to this rationale is that the prosecution of such crimes has
little social utility and may be used for motives other than the
protection of society.
This rationale is directly applicable to the tax fraud area. Tax
fraud is probably one of the most frequently committed offenses in
our society. 7 In any event, millions of people are susceptible to
being prosecuted for it. Since only a limited number of these people
can be prosecuted because of, among other reasons, the limited personnel of the IRS, arbitrary selection of those to be prosecuted is
possible. Tax fraud prosecutions can be selected for purposes other
than enforcement of tax laws and collection of revenue. It is no
secret that the Department of Justice has a special group classified
as "racketeers.""8 These people are suspected by the government of
having committed various crimes, other than tax fraud, which cannot be proven. Special scrutiny is given, therefore, to their tax affairs. Furthermore, tax prosecutions may be suspected of being
65.
66.

E.g., Lucille S. Poole, 1951 P-H TAX CT. MEM. %51, 116.
See United States v. Eliopeulos, 45 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1942);

see generally 1 WHARTON,
67. See HELLERSTEIN,
68.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 367 (10th ed. 1918).
TAXES, LOOPHOLES AND MORALS (1962).

See testimony of Commissioner Caplin before the House ApproSTANDARD FEDERAL TAX REPORTS § 8955.

priations Committee in 1961 CCH
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politically motivated."9
By precluding prosecutions for tax evasions which may have
occurred six or more years ago, the scope of the IRS' discretion is
limited. It can be argued, however, that so long as there is a larger
number of evaders within the years open to prosecution than can be
prosecuted, some arbitrary means of selection must be used. Nevertheless, the smaller the group from which to choose, the less arbitrariness in selection can be indulged provided the number of prosecutions remains constant. Also, the statute places a limit upon the
government's ability to use the tax laws as a weapon to harass a
person by going through his tax returns for past years to find a tax
offense. Moreover, a statute of limitations forces the IRS to be
more diligent in investigating and prosecuting crimes. In failing to
act expeditiously, the IRS will be precluded by time from prosecuting successfully. This then gives the IRS an added impetus not
to procrastinate.
Since the government is the proponent in both criminal and
civil tax fraud the idea of arbitrary action by government officials
applies as well to civil cases. The ability to select defendants arbitrarily is just as prevalent as in the criminal case. Furthermore,
under two recent Supreme Court decisions 0 the government may
subpoena a taxpayer's records without showing reasonable cause for
belief of fraud so long as there is a possible legitimate purpose for
the subpoena. Therefore, since there is no statute of limitations
in civil tax fraud, the government can harass an individual by
calling for his records for years long past, alleging civil tax fraud as
the legitimate purpose.
Deterrent Effect of Speedy Prosecution
Another consideration that generally is thought to be incorporated in the statute of limitations is the belief that deterrence of
future criminal activity is promoted by rapid prosecution of crime. 71
The statute of limitations makes the government prosecute rapidly
and thereby accomplishes greater deterrence. Possibly, the rationale for this notion might be that unless prosecution is undertaken
rapidly after the publicity of a crime, the public will assume that
the lawbreaker has succeeded. The public may not relate a prosecution with a crime that is far divorced in time.
Although this rationale may be relevant in the normal criminal
69.
1939).
70.
379 U.S.
71.

See, e.g., United States v. Pendergast, 28 F. Supp. 601 (W.D. Mo.
Ryan v. United States, 379 U.S. 61 (1964); United States v. Powell,
48 (1964).
BECCARIA, CnMs AND PUNISHMETrS 74 (2d ed. 1819).
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case, it is irrelevant to tax fraud because tax fraud is a crime of
secrecy. Consequently, the argument concerning the correlation in
the public mind between the time of the offense and the prosecution
has little validity. Usually the first time the public knows that an
individual evaded his taxes is when he is prosecuted.
Another possible explanation of the deterrence theory is that
prompt prosecution of the lawbreaker lessens the time he has to
enjoy the fruits of his crime. Rapid enforcement will prevent a
potential lawbreaker, in balancing the benefit he will derive from
the crime against the risk of being caught, from weighing on the
side of nonpayment the value of delay in penalization. Ridiculous
as it may seem, some people may count on getting caught, but
weigh the delay period against the punishment and decide the de72
lay is worth the penalty.
This explanation, contrary to the rationale of the correlation of
act and punishment in the mind of the general public, is relevant
to tax fraud. If the prosecution is for evasion which happened in
the distant past, the weighing of alternatives may be important.
An individual may reason that he can successfully evade his taxes;
however, even if he is caught, he will have had the use of the money
over this period of time. Consequently, the promotion of quick
prosecutions will eliminate the delay element which may have
tipped the scales in the decision to evade. Obviously, for the
unique person, who only weighs the delay against the penalty, a
quick prosecution would deter him completely. The delay period
becomes even more important in tax fraud than in other criminal
cases because, generally, the criminal penalties for tax fraud meted
out by the courts are very small. 73 A potential evader, knowing
the possible penalties are small if he is unsuccessful, may consider
the time of delay more heavily because of this lack of penalization.
The only valid rationale for a statute of limitations in criminal
tax fraud in relation to rapid prosecution is the contention that
delay may tip the scales in favor of committing the crime, but this
argument appears to be weak when faced with the other factors
which would sway the potential evader.
72.

See Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924), concerning the fi-

nancial dealings of a certain Perzi. He advertised that to any person who
would lend him one hundred dollars, he would repay one hundred fifty in
ninety days. By paying earlier creditors with funds he later borrowed, he
amassed a tremendous debt. When his financial bubble burst there was
no indication that he had ever intended to flee with the money prior to
its collapse.
73. See Long, The Use of Criminal Sanctions for Tax Violations, 12
TUL. TAX INST. 389 (1963), for illustration of the wide range of sentences
for tax fraud. In one area only thirteen out of seventy tax evaders re-

ceived a jail term.
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The civil penalties also serve the purpose of protecting the
revenue by acting as a general deterrent to taxpayers whose conscientious scruples may not be sufficient to balance their hopes of
profits.74 Since they are not exclusive, but cumulative to the criminal penalties, these will be added inducements for a person to pay
promptly when he weighs the possible punishments against the
benefits of evading his taxes. It may also be argued that they are
a deterrent upon the gambler who attempts to evade taxes hoping
to have the statute of limitations bar any prosecutions. Since actions for civil penalties can be brought at any time, the temptation
to gamble on obtaining the bar of the criminal statute is not as
attractive to the taxpayer as it would be if he could escape punishment altogether.
Conversely, the pressure of the statute of limitations on public
officials to act speedily so that the guilty taxpayer will not have
time to enjoy the money he retained by evading taxes is equally as
pertinent in the civil area as in the criminal. The civil action recovers the cash. Furthermore, since the civil tax fraud case is
brought in order to reimburse the government for loss of revenues,
the government's chances of being paid are increased by a more
rapid prosecution to final judgment, since the taxpayer has less
opportunity to dissipate his funds.
Subsidiary to the deterrent effect of immediate prosecutions
is the notion that the statute of limitations focuses the enforcement
efforts of public officials upon recent activities and crimes, which
75
are a greater threat to society than those in the past.

Recent

activities may be by nature ongoing, and irreparable damage to
society could be produced; but by definition past activities have
been completed and the harm done. Thus a robber who continues
to rob banks creates a present danger to the physical safety of
society; but a "retired" robber is of no concern to society's present
well being.
This factor has little significance in the tax field. Society is
not placed in present danger of great injury by the crime of tax
evasion so that the crime must be stopped immediately, unless the
evasion is of such magnitude, which is unlikely from past experience, that it brings on a financial crisis. Whether the tax loss was
in the past or present makes little difference to society as a whole,
the only concern is collecting the revenue.

74. E.g., Dorsheimer v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 166 (1868).
75. 1 WHARTON, Op. cit. supra note 58, § 867.
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POLICIES COUNTERVAILING TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Recovery of Government Revenue
At the early common law the royal prerogative included the
doctrine that lapse of time would not bar the right of the Crown.
Today, although this original justification for the rule no longer
exists, public policy is given as a basis for its continuance.

The

doctrine is said to preserve the public rights, revenues and property from injury and loss through the negligence of public officers.

At the present time the doctrine is supported because of the protecloss by the dilatory enforcement of
tion it affords taxpayers from 76
public rights by public officials.
This may be one of the reasons no statute of limitations has
been enacted for civil tax fraud but has been for criminal tax fraud.
Two of the purposes of the civil phase of the case are to protect the
government from loss of revenue and to reimburse it for the expense incurred in prosecuting and investigating the particular
fraud.7 7 It is questionable, however, to what extent the government really profits when a tax fraud prosecution is delayed over
six years. The expense of procuring old evidence to reconstruct
the taxpayer's income, the increased time required to trace these
past events and the amount that could be recovered if the time were
used instead to investigate recent tax frauds must be weighed
against the additional revenue recovered. Although there is no
published study weighing the revenue gain versus the additional
expense incurred, it is questionable whether the amount recovered
is significant.
From the viewpoint of who can best bear the loss, it is anomalous to have a statute of limitations in ordinary civil suits between
private parties and not to impose a similar restriction on suits by

the government against a taxpayer. In both cases the plaintiff
seeks to recover money. Nevertheless, a private plaintiff's action,
though legitimate, is subject to the statute, but the government's
is not. The government, which can distribute a loss throughout the
public is not barred from its claim by the statute. A private citizen, however, who is less able to bear such a loss is required to do
SO.
Deterrence
Although quick prosecutions may be desirable, the statute of
limitations may not be the best means to obtain it. It can be argued
that a statute of limitations may encourage people to break the law
76.
77.

Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938).
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938).
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on the gamble they can avoid being discovered until the statute has
run. For the person who intends to evade successfully, the prospect
of the bar of the statute of limitations may be more instrumental
in making his decision to evade than the notion of delay. He may
play the game of "treasury roulette," hoping that the government
will not select his return for audit, since he may know that the
government can audit only five per cent of the returns submitted
each year.78 Even if the government selects his return for audit,
he may be successful in stalling the indictment for six years, thus
barring prosecution.
Without a statute, prosecutions of old evasions will deter potential evaders by showing them that the government will continue to
investigate and possibly prosecute them even after an extended
period of time. Thus, to some extent, it would appear that the
general deterrence of possible tax evaders would be increased by
not having the six year criminal statute of limitations. Perhaps
because the legislature decided that the other policies in the criminal area were so weighty it accepted this loss of deterrence, but,
as a compromise, provided that the civil tax fraud sanctions should
not be precluded by time. Yet, realistically, does the statute of
limitations enter into the considerations of potential tax evaders?
Finally, do those who may consider the statute of limitations when
they intend to evade taxes, worry about the civil tax penalties or
only the criminal sanctions? No analytical study has been made,
but it is questionable how many people really consider these factors
when they attempt to evade taxes.
Time Necessary to Investigate and Prosecute
Balanced with the idea of fairness to the defendant must be the
countervailing idea of allowing the plaintiff or prosecutor enough
time to investigate and prepare his case. This factor must be considered when establishing a statute of limitations in any area of the
law. The government must have adequate time to investigate and
prepare in order to give effect to the substantive law.
Tax fraud cases and investigations are, at best, slow and timeconsuming. 9 One of the government's most difficult problems is
locating potential tax evaders. Returns must be audited, cross
checked, and routine investigations made. After a person has
been designated a suspect, the government investigates every
source of his income. When the government uses an indirect meth78.

IRS

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONM OF THE INTERNAL REVE-

NuE SERvIcE (1964).

79.
(1961).

See Heffron, Limitations in Fraud Cases, 19 N.Y.U.

TAx INST.

1195

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

od of proof, any leads given by the taxpayer to the government as
to possible non-taxable sources of his increase in net worth must
be investigated and negated by the government before they have a
prima facia case. 0 This requires an exhaustive search. Moreover,
the IRS has a heavy volume of work for the manpower available.
With the installation of the new automatic data processing equipment, much of the preliminary routine work will be lessened,
easing the load on the IRS.81 That equipment will, among other
things, cross check sources of income from one return to another
and run routine checks on the tax returns.
Tax fraud, although hard to detect, is not as difficult to discover
as ordinary fraud. In an ordinary fraud situation, such as embezzlement, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until
82
the defrauded knows or reasonably should know of it.

The em-

bezzler is usually in a fiduciary relationship with the defrauded;
thus the defrauded is lulled into a state of complacency. Also, because of the fiduciary relationship, it is extremely difficult for the
defrauded person to learn of the embezzlement. In tax fraud, however, no fiduciary relationship exists. It can hardly be said that
the government is lulled into complacency, since it maintains the
IRS to constantly check on the taxpaying public. The taxpayer is
also required to file a tax return which is notice of possible fraud in
itself. In the situation where the taxpayer does not file a return
the IRS' job may be more difficult. However, the government has
the returns of others who have dealt with the taxpayer. These returns may put them on notice as to the taxpayer's fraud. If there is
fraud, this makes it likely that it will be discovered.
Until there is a statistical analysis made to determine the time
required to discover, investigate, and prosecute tax fraud cases,
the time set for criminal tax fraud seems reasonable. Less time
should be required for the civil tax fraud case than for the criminal
since the standard of proof is less. If, however, allowance is made
for the criminal first, civil later policy, any civil statute of limitations enacted must be longer than the criminal.
Criminal First, Civil Later
The IRS has developed the administrative policy of trying the
criminal phase of the case first and upon its completion the civil
80. Thomas v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1959).
81. See testimony of Commissioner Caplin, op. cit. supra note 68.
82. E.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 38, § 3-6 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 211 (1964).

Fall 1966]

STATUTES OF LIMITATION

case. 83 One reason for this procedure is to prevent the taxpayer
from discovering the government's evidence and theory of the
criminal case in the preceding civil proceedings, either by the trial
itself or by use of the civil discovery rules. 84 The government
thereby retains the tactical advantage of not having exposed its
entire case before the criminal trial.
Although this tactical advantage may have been the reason for
the development of the criminal first, civil later policy, another
justification has developed as a result of the Lefkowitz 5 case. If
the government convicts the taxpayer of criminal tax fraud, in the
subsequent civil case the IRS does not have to prove fraud again-.
This saves the government the time and expense of presenting the
same evidence. If the civil case were litigated first and fraud
proved, the fraud issue would be open to attack in the later criminal
case because of the higher standard of proof required.86
Besides the government's saving of time and expense, as a
result of the Lefkowitz case the Commissioner has obtained additional advantages in the subsequent civil case if he succeeds in the
criminal. As discussed previously, the elimination of the fraud
issue from the civil case allows the government to allege every possible item to inflate the deficiency without risk of confusing the
fraud issue. Consequently, the amount of money the government
recovers from civil tax fraud cases should increase. Moreover, the
Commissioner has the presumption of correctness throughout this
civil proceeding, where formerly the burden was on the IRS to
prove fraud, which included proving a substantial deficiency. Of
course, once this substantial deficiency was found as a part of the
fraud issue, the Commissioner's determination of the exact amount
was presumed correct.8 7 To explain this to a jury was confusing
and undoubtedly, in many cases, the jury would cast the burden on
the government completely. Arguably, by the Lefkowitz case eliminating this explanation to the jury concerning the burden of proof,
the government is now in a better position in the civil case after
fraud is established in the criminal one. There is less chance of the
jury shifting the burden of proof as to the amount of the deficiency
to the government.
The criminal first, civil later policy also gives the government,
if it chooses, two chances to prove fraud against the taxpayer.
Whether the criminal suit fails or succeeds, the government can al83.
84.
85.
86.

See, e.g., Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962).
Ibid.
334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964).
Cf. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 US. 391. See also cases cited supra

note 46.
87. See cases cited supra note 46.
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ways bring the civil suit. On the other hand, if the civil suit is
completed prior to the criminal action and the taxpayer is successful, the Lefkowitz case would appear to support the proposition
that the criminal tax fraud issue would be collaterally estopped in
favor of the taxpayer. Since the Lefkowitz court held that the
fraud issue was the same in both the civil and criminal case except that the government had a heavier burden of proof to carry in
the criminal case, government's success in the criminal proceeding
estops the taxpayer from relitigating fraud in the civil case. Logically, if the government fails to establish fraud in the civil case
where it has a lighter burden, it should be estopped in the criminal
case. There is no additional element in the civil case on which the
trier of fact could decide the case without concluding there was no
fraud. Further, there does not seem to be any policy reason to differentiate between the two situations.
Although the criminal first policy gives various advantages to
the government, especially in the subsequent civil trial, so long as
wide open discovery is not provided in the criminal cases and we
have both criminal and civil tax fraud, the administrative policy
of criminal first civil later is justifiable as it saves time and expense.
Since the IRS screens its tax fraud cases carefully, many more
guilty taxpayers are prosecuted than innocent ones; therefore, in
the overall view, the government and the guilty tax evaders save
time and expense in relitigating the fraud issue in the civil case.
Since in only ten to fifteen per cent of the criminal cases are the
taxpayers found not guilty,88 only in this small number of cases
will the fraud issue be relitigated, and it may be even less if the
government does not institute the civil case. Conversely, if the
civil case is brought first and the government were to continue to
succeed eighty-five per cent of the time in the subsequent criminal prosecutions the fraud issue will be relitigated many more
times than under the criminal first policy. Consequently, as a
whole, the government and tax fraud litigants would spend more
money on the trial process.
If the policy of criminal first, civil later is to continue, any
civil statute of limitations enacted cannot be the same length as
the criminal one. Otherwise, the government will not have the entire time allotted by the criminal period of limitations to bring its
criminal action. To preserve this policy, the IRS would have to
calculate the time required to complete the criminal case, subtract
this period from the six year statute of limitations and begin their
criminal case prior to this time; otherwise the civil phase of the
case would be precluded by the statute of limitations.
88. See testimony of Commissioner Caplin, op. cit. supra note 68.

Fall 1966]

STATUTES OF LIMITATION
CAPSULE OF BASIC POLICIES

In the final analysis, statutes of limitation are legislative
compromises between various policies. In criminal tax fraud they
undercut the retributive and deterrence theories to a limited extent in favor of other policies which are considered more important.
Four of the most important are as follows: (1) fairness to taxpayers accused of fraud whose defense may be hampered because of
the deterioration of their evidence through the passage of time;
(2) the courts' ineffectiveness in reaching a just decision after a
long period of time; (3) the assurance of mental tranquillity of
prospective defendants and lack of social utility in punishing a person who has been rehabilitated and (4) a limitation on the arbitrary action of public officials.
In the civil tax fraud area, the loss of revenue and deterrence of
potential tax evaders are policies which would be limited by having
a statute of limitations. The amount of additional revenue collected
in the absence of a statute is questionable, and the deterrence
gained is negligible. Moreover the administrative procedure of
criminal first, civil later would not enter into the balance if the
government were given time after the completion of the criminal
case to institute its civil proceedings.
Even though the same policies which support the six year
criminal statute of limitations militate for the enactment of a statute of limitations for civil tax fraud, it might be argued that the
difference in sanctions is the factor which justifies a criminal and
not a civil statute of limitations for tax fraud.
In criminal tax fraud, the punishment may be imprisonment
whereas in civil, the maximum loss is money. This difference in
penalty makes the policies behind the criminal statute of limitations much more weighty than those for civil fraud. Our society
is much more concerned with the protection of the person and his
dignity than with property. On these grounds, the legislature
could have reached the decision that a criminal statute of limitation
was necessary, but a civil one was not. Nevertheless, the lack of a
civil statute of limitations has made it possible for the IRS to circumvent the criminal statute of limitations, thus defeating the
more weighty policies underlying the criminal statute of limitations. This technique can best be illustrated by a simple hypothetical.
THE TAXPAYER'S DILEMMA

Suppose that the IRS suspects in 1966 that Taxpayer has evaded
his taxes for the year 1955, for which year Taxpayer filed a timely
tax return on March 15, 1956. The IRS knows that a criminal
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prosecution is barred because the six year statute of limitations has
run. They call Taxpayer to an administrative conference concerning his civil liability for which there is no statute of limitations
when fraud is involved. 9 Taxpayer is questioned, either under
oath or not, by the IRS concerning the alleged tax evasion in 1955.
Taxpayer, on being questioned, cannot claim a constitutional privilege against self incrimination. Even if he evaded his taxes, he is
no longer subject to prosecution under section 7201 as the six year
statute of limitations has run.D° Therefore, by answering truthfully he will not incriminate himself of a crime. There is little
chance of succeeding in an argument that the question is not "material" to the investigation or that the investigation is not for a
proper purpose. He must answer. Taxpayer is faced with two
alternatives, each of which is distasteful. If he acknowledges the
tax evasion, whether he did it or not, (1) he is immediately subject
to an assessment for the deficiency, civil penalties and interest;
(2) he stands as a confessed tax evader which may bring public
scorn and censure; and (3) if he is a professional person, he may
lose his professional standing. If he chooses to deny the evasion, he
runs the risk that the IRS will not believe him and will prosecute
him for the following crimes: (1) perjury if under oath, (2) a false
statement to a governmental agency, (3) a "new" section 7201 offense by alleging this statement as an attempt to evade or defeat
the tax or (4) if it is a joint return or filled out by someone other
than taxpayer, conspiracy, with this statement being the overt act.
His defense is seriously hampered because of the deterioration of
his evidence since the truth or falsity of his statement depends on
the same facts involved in the substantive offense of section 7201.
Hence, Taxpayer runs the risk of being convicted of a criminal
offense in addition to the consequences he would have sustained if
he had admitted evasion. Even if he were to prove his innocence of
the crime, he still would have the burden of going to trial on the
factual issues involved with its consequent expense and publicity.
At least at the administrative level the affair may not receive as
much publicity as at the judicial stage.
Taxpayer is caught in a quandary. The "financial thumb
screws" of the civil assessment and its consequent publicity forces
the taxpayer to deny tax evasion, but conversely, the possibility
of the criminal prosecution pressures the taxpayer to pay this price.
If the year in question were 1961 rather than 1955, the taxpayer
would have the third alternative of refusing to answer on the fifth
amendment grounds that he may incriminate himself of a section
89.

90.

INT. REV. CODE of 1954,

§

6501.

E.g., United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1960).
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7201 offense. This alternative, even though better than the previous two choices, may encourage the IRS to intensify its investigation. The IRS may construe the claim as an implication of guilt and
may also make an immediate assessment after receiving this response. Furthermore, Taxpayer, if he claims his privilege against
self incrimination, will have to forego any advantages he might
otherwise have received for cooperating. The IRS may then move
for an indictment.
The government has another alternative if the taxpayer refuses to answer, however. It can merely wait until the statute of
limitations on section 7201 expires, in which case the fifth amendment is no longer available to the taxpayer.
The Administrative Summons
Until the recent Supreme Court case of United States v.
Powell,9 ' the taxpayer could sometimes avoid being put into the
position of either admitting or denying fraud by arguing that the
government must show reasonable cause to suspect fraud after the
running of the three year statute of limitations on an ordinary
assessment before the subpoena was enforceable. Prior to Powell
most of the circuit courts required the government to show reasonable cause to suspect fraud,9 2 although the minority enforced the
summons merely on the assertion of a suspicion of fraud by the
agent.9 3 The split in the circuits resulted from a basic difference
in approach to the statute of limitations. The majority emphasized the taxpayer's reliance on the statute of limitations in the arrangement of his affairs while the minority were more concerned
with the administration of the revenue laws and removing obstacles from the path of the Commissioner.
In Powell, the Supreme Court resolved this conflict in favor of
the Commissioner. The taxpayer had been subpoenaed by a special agent of the IRS to produce his books and records. The summons was issued in March, 1963, for the taxable years 1958 and
1959, which were "closed" unless fraud was found. Powell contended that before he could be forced to produce his records for
"closed" years, the IRS had to indicate some grounds for suspecting
fraud. He also relied on section 7605(b) of the Code which provides:
No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary examination
91. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
92. E.g., DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1963); O'Connor
v. O'Connell, 253 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1958); Globe Constr. Co. v. Humphrey,
229 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1956).
93. Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1959); United States
v. United Distillers Prod. Corp., 156 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1946).
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or investigations, and only one inspection of a taxpayer's
books of account shall be made for each taxable year unless
the taxpayer requests or unless the Secretary or his delegate, after investigation, notifies the taxpayer
in writing
94
that an additional inspection is necessary.
This statute is more restrictive when the taxpayer's books are
to be inspected than when only the taxpayer is examined. When
only the taxpayer is to be examined, the sole restriction is that the
examination not be unnecessary. Since books and records were
being investigated for the second time that year, the taxpayer's position was much stronger than if he, alone, had been subpoenaed.
The Court quickly disposed of both of the taxpayer's arguments:
[T]he Government need make no showing of probable
cause to suspect fraud unless the taxpayer raises a substantial question that judicial enforcement of the administrative summons would be an abusive use of the court's process, predicated on more than the fact of re-examination
and the running of the statute of limitations on ordinary
tax liability.9 5
The Court narrowly construed the prohibitions of unnecessary investigations and from the ambiguous legislative history concluded
that Congress did not intend to hamper the Commissioner by requiring agents to show probable cause to obtain information from
the Taxpayer for "closed" years. It said:
If, in order to determine the existence or nonexistence
of fraud in the taxpayer's returns, information in the taxpayer's records is needed which is not already in the Commissioner's possession, we think the examination is not
'unnecessary'. . . . Although a more stringent interpretation is possible, one which would require some showing of
cause for suspecting fraud, we reject such an interpretation
because it might seriously hamper the Commissioner in
carrying out investigations he thinks warranted, forcing
him to litigate and prosecute appeals on the very subject
which he desires to investigate .... 96
After rejecting the probable cause argument and construing
the term "unnecessary" very narrowly, the Court stated the requirements for enforcement of a summons.
He [the Commissioner] must show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose,
that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the
information sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession, and that administrative steps required by
the Code have been followed .... 9
94.
95.
96.
97.

INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7605(b).

379 U.S. at 51.
Id. at 53-54.
Id. at 57-58.
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These requirements are the same as if the government were
investigating years for an ordinary assessment.9 8 The Court
realized that the summons could be used for harassment, but really
did not come to grips with the problem. It recognized that people
in the lower levels of the administrative structure might continuously inspect and not use judgment; but the court relied on the requirement of authorization by the Commissioner or his delegate to
limit this procedure. It is questionable whether this solution is
realistic since the subpoena power is already delegated to some of
the lesser functionaries in the IRS, for example, revenue and special agents. 9
The Court asserted that the taxpayer could resist the subpoena;
and the courts would not enforce it if he could show that the summons was being used to pressure him in a collateral suit or its purpose was harassment. Not only would the taxpayer have a difficult time obtaining proof to establish this position, except in a very
blatant case, but also he would have the burden to establish this
position. 100 Furthermore, a letter from the United States Attorney
asserting lack of abuse might be sufficient to defeat the taxpayer's
argument. 01
Through the Powell decision the Court has given the IRS almost
complete discretion to summon a taxpayer to a conference at any
time. Civil tax fraud is proveable forever and is a legitimate purpose for the subpoena. Undoubtedly, there is always some information the Commissioner does not have within his possession so
this supposed restriction does not hamper the Commissioner. The
relevancy argument likewise has little possibility of succeeding,
for the subpoena is relevant to determine the taxpayer's civil liability. Thus, the taxpayer must answer, and he has only one of two
choices after the statute of limitations of criminal tax fraud has
expired-admit civil tax fraud and incur its consequences, or deny
fraud and subject himself to the possibility of prosecution for
the crimes discussed above.
INTE NAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 7201

Due to the difficulty in determining when the statute of limitations commences for a section 7201 offense, any statement, other
than an admission of liability, may result in an indictment for
criminal tax fraud. The statute, which provides a six year statute
98. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7602.
99. Rev. Proc. 55-6, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 903.
100. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
Cf. Boren v.
Tucker, 239 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1956).
101. See Matter of Crone Fulview Glass Door Co., 60-1 USTC
9195
(N.D. Ill. 1959).
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of limitations, begins to run at the "commission of the offense.' 10 2
Three elements comprise the offense: willfulness, a substantial
deficiency and an affirmative act which tends to mislead or conceal. 03 Because willfulness, an evil state of mind, and a deficiency
are continuing events, until there is a change of mind or satisfaction
of the deficiency, the problem arises whether the first affirmative
act, which tends to mislead or conceal, completes the offense and
starts the statute of limitations running; or does a subsequent affirmative act constitute an independent violation and begin the
statute running again. Similarly, if a deficiency is innocently created, i.e., forgetting to file a tax return, but willfulness and an
affirmative act occur at a later time when the deficiency is discovered, is this the commission of the offense to begin the statute
of limitations running? Many problems concerning the timing of
the three elements can be postulated. Our concern is with the
effect of a misleading or concealing statement by the taxpayer
after the elements of a tax evasion offense have already occurred.
Does this statement constitute a new violation of section 7201 commencing the statute of limitations to run again?
In United States v. Beacon Brass,04 the Supreme Court was
presented with the problem of whether the phrase in section 7201,
"defeat the tax in any manner," included a taxpayer's false statement to a Treasury representative. The statement affirmed that a
previously filed tax return was correct. Beacon Brass Inc. and its
president had filed a false and fraudulent return for Beacon Brass
on January 5, 1945. In October of 1945, Beacon Brass' president,
one of the defendants, at a conference with the IRS made a false
statement to them for the purpose of concealing his unreported
income. An indictment returned in March, 1951, charging the defendants with tax evasion was dismissed by the trial court as
duplicitous. A second indictment was returned in September, 1951,
charging the defendants with an offense under section 7201. The
government had concluded that a charge under section 1001 for
making false statements concerning any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States was precluded by its three year statute of limitations. Thus, the government argued that a false statement for the purpose of concealing
unreported income was included in the phrase "defeat the tax in
any manner."
The trial court dismissed the second indictment for failing to
charge an offense under section 7201 because section 1001 deals
102.
103.
104.

of 1954, § 6531.
See cases cited supra notes 23, 24 and 25.
344 U.S. 43 (1954).

INT. REV. CODE
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specifically with false statements and Congress must be presumed
to have intended that the making of false statements was to be exclusively punishable under this statute. 10 5
On appeal, as an alternative ground to sustain the dismissal,
the defendants contended that the acts charged constituted only one
crime of tax evasion which was complete when the allegedly false
return was filed. Based on this contention, the defendants argued
that the six year statute of limitations had run; furthermore, dismissal of the first indictment was res judicata which barred the
second indictment for the same offense.
The Supreme Court held that a false statement made to treasury officials constituted income tax evasion despite the fact that the
statements merely substantiated a previously filed return. The
Court refused to pass on defendants' second contention on the
grounds that its jurisdiction in the appeal was limited to reviewing
the construction of the statute. Even though the court refused to
address themselves to this question explicitly, the construction of
the statute by the Court implicitly denied the defendants' second
contention. By holding that a false statement constituted an independent section 7201 violation, this offense could not be committed
until the false statement was made. Logically, the statute of
limitations must run from this point of time. In essence, the Court
held that two separate offenses were committed under section
'7201, the first when the false return was filed, the second when the
false statement was made, even though both crimes had to rely on
the same tax deficiency.
Rather than read the statute as broadly as it did, the Court
could have refused to allow these false statements to be included
within the statute. The Court could have accepted the defendants'
premise by reasoning that these acts must be directed to the attainment of the object that the statute denounced-tax evasion.
This objective was accomplished when the false returns were filed
and that filing terminated the crime which concerned Congress.
Any acts thereafter could not contribute to the crime of tax evasion but were merely acts to conceal it.
6
In the subsequent case of United States v. Sclafani,O the district court was faced with almost the identical situation presented
in Beacon Brass. The tax years involved were 1945 and 1946, and
returns were filed in March of each subsequent year. The government contended that the defendant violated section 7201 by filing
false and fraudulent statements in 1950 and 1951 with the Treasury
105. United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 106 F. Supp. 510 (D. Mass.
1952); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
106. 126 F. Supp. 654 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
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Department for the purpose of concealing additional unreported
income for the years 1945 and 1946. The indictment was returned
in February 1954, over six years from the date of the returns. The
defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of
limitations had run on the alleged tax evasion as it was completed
when the returns were filed. The court, faced with the Beacon
Brass decision, could not escape the conclusion that an independent
section 7201 offense was committed if the taxpayer had filed false
statements with the IRS which tended to conceal his taxes.
Therefore, the statute could not begin to run on this separate offense until it was committed by filing the false statement.
After the Beacon Brass doctrine had developed to this stage, its
further extension could have been limited by holding that the act
subsequent to the false return must be within six years of the
filing or due date of the return. The argument would continue
that the statute of limitations precluded proving the deficiency
after this time unless an act intervened within this six year
period, which coupled with the deficiency would start the statute
of limitations running again. Otherwise, no effect would be given
to the six year statute of limitations.
This case, which was the logical outgrowth of Beacon Brass,
made possible the return of an indictment for a violation of section
7201 for at least twelve years after the return was filed. If a false
statement were made six years after the filing, the six year statute
of limitations commenced to run at that time and would expire
twelve years after the return was filed.
However, in United States v. Mousley, 107 the Beacon Brass
doctrine was extended to its logical limit. In this case, the tax
years involved were 1942-46, and the returns were filed appropriately. The indictment, which was returned in 1961, alleged that the
taxpayer had violated section 7201 when he made false statements
to the IRS in 1955-57 by filing an offer to compromise his tax liabilities for 1942-46 and by applying to discharge his property from
the government's tax liens which secured these same liabilities.
The taxpayer argued, as unsuccessfully as the defendant in
Sclafani, that the statements were all part of the original tax
evasion which offense was completed when his returns were filed.
On this premise the taxpayer contended the statute of limitations
had run. Conversely, the government argued that the false statements constituted the completion of a section 7201 offense which
was wholly independent of the filing of the taxpayers' returns.
The court upheld the government's contention even though the tax
107.

194 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
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years involved were divorced from the allegedly false statements
by a period of nine to fourteen years.
The court based its conclusion on two grounds: (1) that the
taxpayer's false statements were to defeat the civil liability still
owed the government and therefore within the Beacon Brass doctrine of defeating a tax in any manner, and (2) if the taxpayer could
not be punished under section 7201, he could always make false
statements to the IRS to cover up his civil liability without fear of
punishment once the statutes of limitations on section 7201 had
run. The second reason is clearly fallacious. Under present law,
in most cases, this conduct would be punishable under section 1001,
the false statement statute and, if made under oath, the perjury
statute. As to the first reason for its decision, the Mousley Court
seems to be on solid ground logically as an outgrowth of the Beacon
Brass case; however, the decision creates the possibility of continuous criminal liability, in violation of the objectives of the statute
of limitations.
The Supreme Court inferentially has approved the reasoning of
the Mousley Court. In Forman v. United States'08 defendant was
indicted for conspiring to evade the income tax of Seijas and his
wife for the years 1942-45 in violation of section 7201 and for
furnishing false books and records to the Treasury Department
concealing the Seijas' true tax liability in violation of sections 7201
and 1001. The indictment was returned in November 1953, which
was more than six years after the last false tax return was filed.
Thus, only if the overt acts of furnishing false books and records to
the IRS in 1948-52 were in furtherance of the conspiracy, would the
indictment stand. Defendant Forman and Seijas, who were partners in a pinball operation, secretly took receipts from the pinball
machines so that they did not have to split the receipts with the
owners of the premises where the machines were located. These
monies were never entered on the partnership books furnished to
the IRS.
- The trial judge charged the jury that the conspiracy to violate
section 7201 terminated when the last income tax return was filed
in 1946, but that the subsequent acts of furnishing false statements
to the IRS could be in furtherance of an implied subsidiary conspiracy to conceal the crime of tax evasion. The statute of limitations would not bar the indictment on this theory. 1' 9 The defendant was convicted, but the court of appeals reversed because this
.subsidiary conspiracy theory had been condemned by the Supreme
Court in a similar situation when the same charge had been pre108.

109.

361 U.S. 416 (1960).

See Forman v. United States, 259 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1958).
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sented to the jury. The appellate court remanded the case on the
theory that the indictment could be construed to charge a continuing conspiracy to violate section 7201, which was not barred." 0
The court concluded, "the record does not require a conclusion
that the conspiracy here was consummated by the filing of the individual tax returns.'
The Supreme Court approved this theory and rejected the defendants' contention that the conspiracy had ended when the last
income tax return was filed and that, consequently, the statute of
limitations barred the prosecution. The Court held that the evidence of the false statements to the IRS agents was sufficient to
show the continuing conspiracy to evade, even though the original
returns were filed at least two years prior to the statements.
Consequently, the Court held that a conspiracy to violate section
7201 may continue past the filing of the false returns and can be
furthered by subsequent conduct.1' 2 If the offense were completed
when the last of the three elements of section 7201 occurred, i.e.,
filing a false return in this case, the conspiracy would have terminated at the same time, since the objective of violating section
7201 was achieved; hence, the subsequent false statements could
not be in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit this offense. The
defendant advocated this position; but the Supreme Court expressly
rejected it. Therefore, if a conspiracy to violate section 7201 may
continue after filing the return, it is because section 7201 may also
be violated by subsequent conduct, in this case, the false statements. If after filing a false return a defendant may perform acts
which also violate the statute, these acts constitute the basis for a
separate offense of criminal tax evasion and the statute of limitions begins to run at this time.
This case does not necessarily sanction the result in the Mousley
case but only approves the Sciafani case. Mousley could be distinguished since, after the six years have run from the filing of the
return or when the tax is due, the subsequent acts could not further the conspiracy which was successfully terminated with the
expiration of the statute of limitations. With a slight variation,
however, the reasoning in Forman fits the Mousley case. If, as in
Mousley, the objective is defined as evasion of payment of taxes,
which is not subject to a statute of limitations, the subsequent acts
would constitute a section 7201 offense at that time.
Not only can the Beacon Brass doctrine be used to extend and
renew the statute of limitations, but the government can also utilize
110. Forman v. United States, 261 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1958).
111. Id. at 183.
112. 361 U.S. at 422-24.'
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it to convert a section 7203 misdemeanor for willfully failing to
file into a felony offense under .section 7201. If the taxpayer has
failed to file a tax return for a certain year, it would be punishable
under section 7203 if willful. If it was not willful, it would not be
a criminal offense. In either case, however, if the taxpayer answers
any questions concerning the deficiency thus created, the government can argue that the taxpayer has committed a willful affirmative act which coupled with the previous deficiency is a section
7201 offense. Thus, the maximum imprisonment is increased from
one year to five years in jail.
SECTION 1001 OF TIM CRIMINAL CODE
If the taxpayer makes any statement to the IRS concerning his
tax affairs which the Commissioner believes to be false, in the subsequent prosecution the taxpayer's false statement gives the government the alternatives of prosecuting under section 7201 or section 1001 of the criminal code.
Section 1001 provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States knowingly and
willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or
makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the
same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than
113 $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
This statute has uniformly been held to include the IRS as
an agency of the United States.114 Hence, in almost every situation where an offense has been committed under section 7201, section 1001 is potentially applicable. For instance, section 1001 has
been utilized to prosecute taxpayers for submitting false net
worth statements, 115 false tax returns," 0a and false statements,
whether under oath or not, when made in administrative confer117
ences.
From the standpoint of punishment, it is immaterial under
which statute the taxpayer is indicted since the maximum possible
113. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
114. E.g., United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 43 (1954); United
States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1962); Brandow v. United States,
268 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1959); Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168 (10th
Cir. 1955).
115. E.g., Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1962).
116. E.g., Driver v. United States, 199 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1952).
117. United States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1962) (under oath);
Cooper v. United States, 282 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1960) (under oath).
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penalties are identical." 8 Since the government normally need not
prove as many elements under section 1001 as under section 7201 to
obtain a conviction, it is possible that the IRS will use section 1001
to convict the taxpayer rather than section 7201, or, at least, join a
count in the indictment for violation of section 7201. The joining of
offenses appears to be its standard practice.11 9
Under section 7201, the government must establish beyond a
reasonable doubt (1) willfulness, (2) a substantial deficiency in
the tax and (3) an affirmative act, the likely effect of which would
be to conceal or mislead. 120 Under section 1001 the government has
to prove only (1) a false statement knowingly made, (2) within
the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States and (3) materiality in some jurisdictions and no materiality in the Second
21
Circuit.
As can be seen by comparing the elements required to violate
the two statutes, section 1001 is violated by the affirmative act of
section 7201 if the affirmative act is a false statement. For example,
suppose a taxpayer is being interrogated in 1962 by the IRS concerning the understatement of his gross income for a certain year
and the taxpayer says that he received a monetary gift from a
certain individual equal to the alleged understatement. Under
section 1001, the IRS could prosecute the taxpayer for his false
statement merely by proving -that the taxpayer made this statement knowing it was false. Possibly the issue of materiality of the
question may arise, but, in many circuits, this would not be a problem to the IRS. Under section 7201, the government would have to
negate this source of income and still prove willfulness and a substantial deficiency.
In this manner the false statement statute can be used to avoid
the six year criminal statute of limitations. on tax fraud. As the requirements for a section 1001 violation are less stringent than
section 7201, the circumvention is much easier for the IRS. Thus, if
the statute of limitations for criminal tax fraud is to be made effective, any amendment must not only consider section 7201 but
also section 1001, for both sections allow the IRS to couple a recent
statement with an ancient. act as a basis for prosecution. Never118.- Compare INT..REV. CODE.of- 1954, § 7201,. with 1.8I
U.S.C. 4 1001
"
(1964).
119. See, e.g., Ponian v. United States, 294 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1961);
Smith v. United States, 257 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1958); Gaunt v. United
States, 184 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1950).
120. See cases cited supra notes 23, 24 and 25.
121. United States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1962); Poonian v.
United States, 294 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1961); Brandow v. United States, 268
F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Silver, 235 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1956).
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theless, in some situations the purpose and scope of section 1001
may prevent its use for the avoidance of the statute of limitations
for criminal tax fraud found possible under section 7201. This possibility requires an evaluation of the purpose and scope of section
1001 in relation to section 7201 and its statute of limitations.
Purpose and Scope of Section 1001
The false statement statute was originally a part of a statute
passed over a hundred years ago as a result of frauds against the
United States. As originally enacted, the statute proscribed making of false claims against the United States and making of false
statements to agencies in support of such claims defrauding the
United States. 122 In 1934, at the urging of the Secretary of the
Interior, all words concerning purpose were deleted from the statute. The purpose of the change was to broaden the statute so as
to reach not only false papers presented in connection with a claim
against the government, but also non-monetary frauds such as
those involved in "hot oil" shipments. The Congressional intent
was to protect the authorized functions of government departments
and agencies from the perversion which might result from the
practices described in the statute. 12 3 It has been settled that the
statement may either be oral or written and under oath or not
under oath.1 24 The only real issue outstanding is the broad question concerning in what circumstances the statute applies. At the
minimum, the government must prove the following elements to
make out an offense under section 1001: (1) a statement, (2) its
falsity, (3) that the false statement be made knowingly and willfully, and (4) that the false statement be made in a matter within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.
These are the elements as established by the Second Circuit under
its "plain meaning" reading of the statute. 125 All the other courts
which have considered the statute, have required that the statement also must be "material," although the test for materiality is
not uniform. When the courts speak of materiality they are referring not to whether the question is material to the matter being
122. United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 (1941). For an excellent
history of the statute see United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md.
1958).
123. Ibid. In 1948, the statute was split in two. One section, 18 U.S.C.
§ 287 (1964), now covers false claims while 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964) governs
false statements. When the statute was divided, there was no change in
meaning or effect. See United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 508 (1955).
124. See Cooper v. United States, 282 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1960); Knowles
v. United States, 224 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1955).
125. See United States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1962); United
States v. Silver, 235 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1956).
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investigated, but whether the situation in which the response was
elicited was within the purpose of the statute. Thus some courts
have attempted to limit the all-inclusiveness of the language of
the statute by requiring that the statement must be an affirmative, aggressive action or a required statement calculated to pervert
the legitimate functions of the government. 1-6 Still others suggest
that a distinction should be made between a statement made to
an investigative officer and an administrator, with a statement
given to an investigative officer not being included within the
purpose of the statute.

127

Some courts will not apply section 1001 to the situation where
the taxpayer has been summoned to an administrative tax conference; however, others would. 128 Possibly a distinction may be
drawn between the situation when a taxpayer answers a question
without being required, although the possibility of a summons and
contempt prosecution may be in the background, and when the taxpayer has answered after being summoned. 129 As a result of the
confusion in interpretation of this statute by the various courts, an
examination of its development and possible distinctions is necessary to determine to what extent it can be used to avoid the statute
of limitations for criminal tax fraud, and whether this circumvention must be tolerated because of the need for this statute.
Development in the Second Circuit
As stated above, the Second Circuit relies on the "plain meaning" of the statute to establish the elements of a section 1001 offense. The Second Circuit's leading case is United States v.
Silver.130 There, an investigation of an employee of the IRS was
being conducted on the basis of an informer's accusation of bribery.
The defendant falsely denied having visited a certain woman
while she was in prison and denied ever having used an alias other
than his own. The defendant contended that section 1001 required
the indictment to allege materiality, but the trial judge denied the
motion to dismiss and submitted the issue to the jury. The court
stated:
[T]here is no separate and additional requirement of materiality, beyond the explicit elements of the crime as defined in the statute. .

.

But there is properly a distinc-

126. See United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88 (D. Colo. 1953).
Contra, Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1955).
127. E.g., United States v. Citroen, 221 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1958).
128. Compare cases cited supra note 126 with cases cited note 127.
129. Cf. United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88 (D. Colo. 1953).
130. 235 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1956).
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tion between a scheme of concealing or covering up a 'material fact' and the making of a false, fictitious or fraudulent statement. An attempt to conceal or cover up may
properly be limited only to facts which are important and
material. On the other hand, a fact deliberately or wilfully
misstated in a matter of appropriate government inquiry
seems properly punishable even if it is only a gratuitious
red herring. As such it can of course, obstruct, delay, or
deflect the inquiry ....

11

In reaching the materiality question, the court implicitly assumed that the purpose of the statute covered the situation in
which an investigation was being conducted. The statute was construed to include almost any statement made to a government officer which may have some perverting potential on the government
agency involved. Certainly, this broad construction of section 1001
would include a statement made to an Internal Revenue Agent
during the investigation of a taxpayer, whether for civil or criminal
tax fraud.
In United States v. Philippe,1" 2 a district court in the second
circuit construed the Silver case narrowly and held that section

1001 was not applicable to answers given to an IRS special agent
in a tax fraud investigation. The court ruled that a false oral
denial by a defendant of a suspected source of income was not a
false statement within section 1001. The court reasoned that the
statements were not calculated to and could not pervert the functioning of the IRS. The only purpose of the questions was to elicit
answers that would incriminate the taxpayer. "The only possible
effect of exculpatory denials however false, received from a suspect
such as defendant is to stimulate the agent to carry out his function."'13 The Silver case was distinguished on the grounds that
there the administrative functioning of the agency was directly in
issue and that it only decided the narrow question that the indictment was not legally insufficient because it did not allege the
false statements were material.
The Second Circuit, in United States v. McCue,134 has disapproved the reasoning in the Philippe case, but purported to leave
open the narrow question of the "exculpatory no" when given in an
investigative situation: "The case of the citizen who replies to the
' 35
policeman with an 'exculpatory no' can be left until it arises.'
How the court was able to disapprove Philippe and leave the
"exculpatory no" question open is ambiguous. Any of the following
131. Id. at 377.
132. 173 F. Supp. 582 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
133. Id. at 584.
134. 301 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1962).
135. Id. at 455.
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possibilities exists: (1) The court in Philippe was incorrect in
that the denial could have perverted the functioning of the IRS;
(2) the denial in Philippe was not an "exculpatory no;" (3) the
denial was not made to a police officer; (4) the court was not to
determine in each particular case whether there is a possibility of
a perversion of governmental activities, but there is irrebutable
presumption of perversion.
On examining the cases cited by the Second Circuit, their position becomes even more beclouded. The McCue court cited the
137
1
cases of United States v. Davey'- and United States v. Stark
as examples of "exculpatory no" cases on which the court was not
passing. Yet it is difficult to distinguish these cases from Philippe.
In United States v. Davey, the defendant was being informally
questioned by FBI agents about his draft registration. He was
asked whether he knew a person by the name of Enos Jennings
Boomwell and was then asked if he were the person who used that
name in registering. The defendant answered "no" to each inquiry. The court held these were not within the contemplation of
section 1001 because they were not aggressive or required statements but were denials of a defensive nature. The court went on
to say the statements were not within the jurisdiction of the FBI
and that did not pervert the official function of the FBI.
United States v. Stark raised a similar question in a prosecution of certain contractors for giving false statements to FBI
agents investigating an alleged bribery attempt. Defendant falsely
answered questions put to him by the FBI agents as to whether he
paid money to any employee or agent of the FHA and whether he
knew of anyone else who did. The court held that these answers
were not statements within the meaning of the term in section 1001.
The court refused to look to the dictionary sense of the word but
looked to see if the statements could pervert the normal functioning
of the governmental agency involved. In other words, it looked at
the context in which the answers were given. The court determined that the statute was aimed only at voluntary aggressive action by the citizen, not merely passive answers to questions by the
FBI agents and, furthermore, that the answers would not pervert
the FBI functions.
In both of these cases, the reasoning is analogous to that in
Philippe, which the court disapproved. The only distinction appears to be that in these cases it was an FBI agent who was the
interrogator, while in Philippe it was a Special Agent of the IRS.
136.
137.

155 F. Supp. 175 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955).
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This appears to be a distinction without a difference, as both are
investigators.
The disapproval of Philippe in the McCue case seems to foreclose the "exculpatory no" issue although the court purported
to leave the question open. Regardless of the circumstances, it
would appear that any utterance, if false, by a taxpayer to the IRS
is punishable under section 1001 in the second circuit. Nevertheless, a district court in the second circuit has resisted this line of
reasoning. In United States v. Citreon'3 8 the issue of a false
denial to an IRS agent was raised again. The defendant was
charged under section 1001 with falsely representing to a treasury
agent that he had filed his income tax returns for certain years.
In moving to dismiss these counts defendant argued that section
1001 was not meant to cover false exculpatory answers made to a
federal investigating agent. Although the nature of the answers
would have to be determined at trial, the court went out of its
way to agree with the defense. The court was willing to carve out
an exception to section 1001 by distinguishing between administrative proceedings and investigations on the ground of policy:
Although the line between administrative and investigation
cannot always be sharply drawn, it is arguable that the
statute was not intended to require, in every conceivable
situation of its kind, a citizen to answer truthfully questions put to him in the course of police or other criminal
investigation. Otherwise, the statute would give powerful
to inquisition as a method of criminal investigaimpetus
3
tion.1 9
Although the court appears to be on solid policy grounds and
is in agreement with many other circuits, this argument had been
rejected by the Second Circuit Court in McCue. The district court
was on shaky grounds in attempting to distinguish its case from
McCue because defendants appeared voluntarily, with counsel and
under oath. These facts do not distinguish the case from Philippe,
which McCue had disapproved.
Under this expansive construction of section 1001, it would
appear unlikely that the Second Circuit Court would exclude convictions under section 1001 in tax fraud cases where the taxpayer is
required to answer questions after the statute of limitations on
criminal tax fraud has expired. The "plain meaning" of the statute
would include any situation in which the IRS can establish the
taxpayer made a false statement to an agent concerning his taxes.

138.
139.

221 F. Supp. 454 (S.D. N.Y. 1963).
Id. at 455.
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Development Outside the Second Circuit
The other courts which have considered section 1001 have
limited its scope so as not to sweep within its grasp almost every
false statement by a citizen when dealing with a governmental
agent. Although they have not been consistent in all respects, at a
minimum they have imposed a rather weak requirement of materiality which, in many cases, would exclude the situation where
the taxpayer is summoned or requested to appear by the IRS and
merely answers questions posed by the Internal Revenue agents.
In United States v. Stark,140 the court said it would apply section
1001 only to voluntary aggressive action by the citizen which could
pervert the function of the agency involved. This court attempted
to strike a balance between the legislative purpose-protecting
the agencies from perversion by false statements-and protection of
citizens from inquisitorial procedures. The court held that mere
denials would not pervert the agency's normal proper activities.
By comparison, the volunteering of information, making a claim
against the government or seeking action by it would be affirmative actions coming within the protective scope of section 1001.
Perversion would occur only when the government would have
reasonable grounds to rely on matters put forward by the defendant.

14 1

4
A different approach was taken in United States v. Levin,' 2
decided by a district court in the Tenth Circuit. The defendant
was indicted for, inter alia, making a false statement to the FBI.
The statement was not made under oath and the defendant was
not required to answer. The court ruled that these false statements
did not violate section 1001.

The court relied on the facts (1) that an inquiry might be made
of any citizen and, if he wilfully falsified his statements, he could
be convicted of section 1001 even though he was not under oath;
(2) that section 1001 was not intended by Congress to reach this
far, otherwise there was no purpose for the perjury statutes which
required an oath; and (3) that a sensible construction would
limit its application to persons under a legal obligation to speak or
to give information to representatives of an agency who had authority to finally dispose of the matter being investigated, and to
cases where the keeping of records or the filing of documents are
required or permitted by law.
140. 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955).
141. Id. at 205.
142. 133 F. Supp. 88 (D. Colo. 1953)
a district court judge).

(Circuit Judge Picket sitting as
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Here, as in United States v. Citreon143 the court was concerned
about the distortion of the relationship between a citizen and his
government and would carve out an exception to section 1001 by
distinguishing between administrative proceedings and investigations. These courts would apply section 1001 to proceedings in
which a final administrative decision was to be made upon the
matter with which the statements were concerned.
Although it agrees with the policy announced in Citreon, the
Levin court would apply section 1001 whenever there is a legal obligation to speak or give information in an administrative setting.
Since the taxpayer is under a legal obligation to answer after the
six year statute of limitations on criminal tax fraud has expired,
the Levin rationale would convict him if the government established that he had made a false statement. If the logic of Levin
were carried this far, the result might be justified by the policy
argument in the case: this is only a civil proceeding to determine
the taxpayer's civil fraud penalty, since the statute of limitations
on criminal tax fraud has expired; therefore the criminal process is
not being distorted. This, however, is a limited view of the criminal
process because the calling of a taxpayer to a conference by a
summons after the criminal statute of limitations has run, may put
pressure on him to deny liability. That denial could result in a
conviction under section 1001. If the taxpayer was not summoned
but requested to come to the conference, it could be argued that he
is not under a legal obligation to answer; therefore, section 1001
is inapplicable. This distinction seems to be unrealistic because the
threat of a summons and contempt proceedings is always present.
It makes no difference to the taxpayer whether he answers because
he was subpoenaed or because he knows that he can eventually be
forced to answer.
The case of United States v. Stark 44 also is concerned with the
use of inquisitorial methods, but, rather than not apply the statute
in any investigative situations, it would only prevent the investigators from prosecuting when the citizen felt compelled to deny
culpability. In essence, the court will not let the citizen commit a
crime when he normally could have used the constitutional privilege of freedom from self incrimination to avoid answering. The
court, however, would give effect to the legislative purpose of the
statute-preventing the perversion of departments and agencies by
false statements. This perversion is accomplished only when the
government would have reasonable grounds to rely on the matter
put forward. Thus, when the government is investigating a citizen
143.
144.

221 F. Supp. 454 (S.D. N.Y. 1963).
131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1958).
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who might have something to hide, the government does not have
any reason to rely on the citizen's denial; but the perversion will
take place if the defendant tries to shift the blame elsewhere and
the government must investigate.
In Paternostro v. United States145 the Fifth Circuit has followed the reasoning in Stark and held that the statement must be
an affirmative, aggressive action calculated to pervert the legitimate
functions of the government to come within section 1001. The IRS
was investigating the payment of graft money in the police department of which defendant was a member. Defendant denied receiving any graft money or having personal knowledge of others
taking it. The issue was whether the negative answers by the defendant, who was under oath, to certain questions by a special agent
of the IRS were within the meaning of "statements" in section 1001.
The court held that the answers were the same as an "exculpatory
no" given to a policeman and were not included within the meaning
of statements under the policy of the statute. The court would not
go as far as to say that section 1001 was not to apply to investigative proceedings but only to administrative proceedings. Furthermore, it did not have to consider what it would do if the statements
were legally required or the fifth amendment privilege against
self incrimination was not available. The problem remains whether
the aggressive action test exists in the face of a legal obligation to
answer and the defendant makes only a defensive answer. On a
petition for rehearing the court distinguished the McCue case on
the grounds that it left open the question of an "exculpatory no"
and reiterated that section 1001 was only to punish affirmative,
aggressive overt misstatement on the part of the defendant. It
should also be noted that the court equated an IRS special agent to
a policeman since both perform the same functions.
There is a direct conflict between the theory in McCue and the
one endorsed by Paternostro. Between these two extremes is a
much weaker test of the applicability of section 1001. In Brandow
v. United States, 145 the court explicitly refused to adopt the Stark
test which requires an affirmative, aggressive action and the possibility of perverting the agency. The prosecution arose out of an
investigation by the IRS of the activities of Ford, one of its
former agents, Brandow, and an attorney. With respect to the
activities of the three in connection with an alleged income tax
fraud, defendant signed an affidavit in which he falsely asserted
that Ford did not say directly or imply that he was willing to disclose the government's case, and that Ford did not discuss the case
145.
146.

311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962).
268 F.2d 558 (10th Cir. 1959).
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with the defaulting taxpayers. The defendant contended, inter
alia, that the false statements were not material. The court rejected the defendant's contention and adopted the test of materiality
expressed in United States v. Quirk'4 7 that:
[W]e believe that the conduct Congress intended to prevent by § 1001 was the willful submission to federal agencies of false statements calculated to induce agency reliance or action, irrespective of whether actual favorable
agency action was for other reasons impossible. We think
the test is the intrinsic capabilities of the false statement
itself, rather than the possibility of the actual attainment
of
148
its end as measured by collateral circumstances.
It is doubtful how much protection this test gives to a citizen
when confronted by an investigator. The answer to almost any
question with which the agency is concerned would be included
even if it is a flat denial of an assertion by the agency. This rule
does protect the citizen from prosecution for totally irrelevant false
statements such as when the investigator says, "How are you?" and
the citizen falsely answers, "Fine." Outside of these rather absurd
situations, this test does not have much significance.
In Quirk the defendant, indicted under section 1001, had submitted a financial statement to the Veterans' Administration concerning an application for a home loan guaranty and insurance.
The application contained false statements of his employment and
earnings. It was conceded by the government that the defendant's
application had been rejected for another reason and, thus, they
could not have been deceived by his false statements. The court
ruled that the statements must be material:
The difficulty arises in the construction of the accepted
test of materiality; whether the false statement has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing,
the decision of a tribunal in making a determination required to be made; or was the statement one that could af149
fect or influence the exercise of a government function.
The court held that this statement had such capability.
Quirk dealt with a purely administrative matter in which defendant's statements normally would have been relied upon without further investigation. Brandow, however, involved an investigation to obtain facts toward a criminal prosecution. Defendant's
answers, if truthful, could have incriminated him, but if false would
not have deterred investigation. In Brandow, the court overlooked
this important factual distinction.
The Ninth Circuit Court has imposed a more rigid test than in
147. 167 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
148. Id. at 464.
149. Ibid.
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Brandow in the subsequent case of Poonian v. United States.15"
The defendant was convicted for false statements in his tax returns, understating "his" income. The evidence at the trial indicated that the income was not his but his mother's and that it was
not reported on her return. The defendant had overstated his income rather than understated it.
The court refused to convict him, by concluding that the action
was for "his" income only; therefore, whether he reported anyone
else's income was immaterial. The court stated:
This is simply a case where, although the appellant may
have intended to falsify, that alone is insufficient to convict,
for it is hornbook law that in every crime there must be
joint union of act and intent. Here, there may have been
intent. There was no act, because it was legally impossible
for appellant to be guilty of having falsified, i.e., understated, income which was not his. 151
As one judge noted in dissent, this changes the standard of materiality as established by the Ninth Circuit in Brandow. He
stated:
Certainly such false statements were calculated to induce Treasury Department reliance or action. The falsity
of the statements was established beyond reasonable doubt
I am unable to agree that appellant's statement of
'his' income is the only matter in which the Internal Revenue Service had a legitimate interest. Had no income
been reported from the extensive agricultural services mentioned in appellant's income tax returns, an investigation
would undoubtedly have been commenced by the IRS to
discover who should report such farm income. The fact
that appellant reported some of the income from such
sources would have a tendency to lull the IRS
into the be152
lief that all such income was being reported.
The majority's opinion is irreconcilable with Brandow. In
Poonian,the tax return was required so that the government would
make a final administrative decision, the situation at which the
statute was explicitly aimed. But in Brandow, the IRS was acting
in its investigative capacity to obtain evidence of criminal activity,
not in its administrative capacity. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning
in these cases is even more incongruous when it is considered that
they accepted the test for materiality as established in the Quirk
case, an administrative setting, and applied it in Brandow to an investigatory situation. Then in Poonian they rejected the test in an
administrative process for a much more stringent test. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit provides more protection against false
150. 294 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1961).
151. Id. at 76.
152. Id. at 77-78 (dissenting opinion).

Fall 1966]

STATUTES OF LIMITATION

statements for the investigator than for the administrative decision
making process. Moreover, the majority appears to require that
the defendant actually commit the substantive offense of violating
section 7201 in relation to his own income tax prior to applying
section 1001 to him. In essence, the court has made sections 7201
and 1001 identical.
Under the rule of United States v. Levin,' 53 such an understatement of income would violate section 1001 because the tax returns were required by law. Similarly, under Stark5 4 and Paternostro 55 the statements were aggressive, affirmative action to mislead and would be punishable. These courts would protect the
functioning of the IRS.
Outside of the Second and the Ninth Circuits, the common
thread among the cases as to non-applicability of section 1001 seems
to be the courts' dislike of the all inclusiveness of the statute. The
statute does not require a lawyer to be present, or a warning to a
possible defendant of the possible criminal punishment, or a deliberately done act such as is usually associated with writing or a statement made under oath, or even that the citizen know for what purpose he is answering.
The courts appear to be trying to establish some safeguards
from the possible misuse of this statute by government officials.
It is too much to ask of any citizen that he be scrupulously honest
when he is being investigated or interrogated concerning his possible criminal conduct. Apparently the courts, with the exception
of the Second Circuit, are attempting to insure that the citizen is
convicted of a falsehood only when it is made in an atmosphere
where the citizen deliberately lies intending to pervert governmental functions rather than only denying certain acts where the
fifth amendment would normally be available to the defendant.
In the situation where the government holds an administrative
conference with a taxpayer in 1962 concerning 1950 or 1960 taxes, it
is unlikely that these courts would convict a taxpayer of violating
section 1001 for merely denying that he had evaded his taxes in
1950 or 1960. Even though the self incrimination privilege is not
available to the taxpayer for 1950 and is available for 1960,
the requirements of perversion of government functions and aggressive action would protect the taxpayer. If the taxpayer were to
go further than a denial of liability, section 1001 would be available
to prosecute him. Thus, if he asserted that the alleged understatement of his tax liability resulted from tax free gifts, he could be
153.
154.
155.

133 F. Supp. 88 (D. Colo. 1953).
United States v. Stark, 151 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1958).
United States v. Paternostro, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962).
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prosecuted under section 1001, except where the line is drawn between investigative and administrative proceedings.
Although the taxpayer has some protection from prosecution
under section 1001 on being interrogated by the IRS, this protection
is limited; section 1001 becomes a likely alternative for the IRS to
utilize to extend or to avoid the policies of the statute of limitations
on criminal tax fraud.
THE PERJURY STATUTE

In addition to the weapons of sections 7201 and 1001, the government has the alternative of using the perjury statute, which
provides:
Whoever, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the
United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that
he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any
written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by
him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath
states or subscribes any material matter which he does
not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall, except
as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined not more
than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both. 56
Purpose and Scope of Statute
The perjury statute was enacted in an effort to keep the course
of justice free from the pollution of perjury, to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the statute is not concerned with
the actual effects of the false testimony, but rather with the perpetration of the falsehood, i.e., the probable wrong done the administration of justice. 15 7 The perjury statute serves much the same
general purpose as section 1001 and might be used to avoid the
158
statute of limitations on criminal tax fraud in the same way.
It has much more stringent safeguards for the citizen than does
section 1001, however. 59 For a conviction under section 1621, the
government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that (1)
the person has taken an oath before an officer who is authorized to
156. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1964). The penalty for perjury is not quite as
severe as those provided in sections 7201 or 1001 since the maximum fine
permitted is $2,000 rather than $10,000. The maximum jail sentence, five
years, is the same.
157. See United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951).
158. See United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950). Defendant
answered questions before a grand jury about events ten years past. Although the statute of limitations had run on the substantive offense, he
was convicted for perjury in answering falsely.
159. Cf. United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88 (D. Colo. 1953).
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administer an oath, (2) while under oath he has made a false statement as to facts which are material to the hearing, and (3) he did
not believe the statement to be true. 60
The largest hurdle for the government to overcome to obtain a
perjury conviction is the evidentiary rule that there must be two
living witnesses or one living witness and substantial corroborating evidence to prove the falsity of the statement.' 6 ' This evidentiary burden may be the reason for so few perjury prosecutions
since it makes perjury one of the hardest crimes to prove. As commentators have illustrated, the courts are Very exacting in requir6 2
ing that this evidentiary rule be satisfied.1
Application to Tax Conference

It is unlikely that the government will utilize the perjury
statute to any great extent while sections 1001 and 7201, as presently construed, are available to them. Section 1001 does not demand the quantum of evidence that is necessary under section 1621,
nor does it require an oath. In many situations section 1001 does
not require materiality, but when it does, it is not as stringent a
standard as under section 1621. The perjury statute is still available, however, if sections 1001 and 7201 are not. If meaningful
changes are to be proposed for those sections, the possible use of
the perjury statute to achieve the same results must be considered.
The oath requirement is not a great stumbling block for IRS
agents as they have the authority to administer oaths if granted by
the Commissioner. 163 A blanket authorization apparently has been
given to every Special Agent. 64 Hence, in any conference or hear160. E.g., United States v. Huass, 355 U.S. 570 (1958); United States
v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374 (1953).
161. E.g., Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606 (1945); Hammer v.
United States, 271 U.S. 620 (1926).
162. E.g., Orfield, Proof of Perjury and the "Two Witness" Requirement in Federal Criminal Cases, 17 Sw. L. J. 227 (1963). Mr. Justice Black
summed up the reasons for the two witness rule as follows:
Lawsuits frequently engender in defeated litigants sharp resentments and hostilities against adverse witnesses, and it is argued,
not without persuasiveness, that rules of law must be so fashioned
as to protect honest witnesses from hasty and spiteful retaliation
in the form of unfounded perjury prosecutions.
Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 608 (1945). But see United States
v. Collins, 272 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1958), noted in 28 GEO. WASH. L. J. 786
(1960); 35 So. CAL. L. REV. 86 (1961). The court upheld the perjury
conviction even though there was no direct testimony of the falsity of
the defendant's statement. Highly probative evidence indicating perjury
served as adequate protection against unfounded retaliation and thus
allowed the court to avoid the two witness rule.
163. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7622.
164. See Cooper v. United States, 233 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1956).
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ing the taxpayer could be sworn by the IRS agent so as to bring
the perjury statute into play. This appears to be the practice in
165
many situations.
The requirement of materiality under the perjury statute has
not been much discussed in reported cases. United States v. Laut1 66
is perhaps the closest factual situation to an "exculpatory no" in
a tax conference. In that case the defendant had denied communist
affiliation in a 1950 immigration proceeding. In 1951 he was being
investigated and was asked under oath if all his statements in the
1950 hearing were true. He 'answered "yes." After the three year
statute of limitations on false statements in immigration proceedings had run, the government indicted the defendant for perjury,
alleging the false statement in 1951 as the crime. The court ruled
that the government had failed to prove the materiality of the false
statements to the matter in issue. Further, the court declined to
agree that a person's answers would be material if he were merely
asked whether his statements in a prior hearing were correct. The
court acknowledged that the question, "Are you now or have you
ever been a member of the communist party?" would be material.
The answer, of course, requires a flat yes or no and would seem to
be no different than asking whether his prior answer was correct.
The materiality requirement was considered in the context of
an IRS investigation in United States v. Goldstein.167 The defendant was being questioned by treasury agents who were investigating
the liability of the company, by which defendant was employed,
and the company's principal stockholders. Defendant had received
certain money from the company which he then returned to the
owners. Defendant reported this money as income on his tax return and paid income tax on it, but this was less than the tax would
have been if it had been declared as dividends. The IRS was attempting to prove that the money was a dividend to the owners.
The defendant asserted that he gave the money in exchange for
shares of stock issued in 1943. In actuality the stock had been issued
in 1945. The court held this answer was material since the date of
issue was important to whether the stock was purchased by defendant or was merely a screen to avoid dividend taxes. As can be
seen from this case, the materiality requirement for perjury is
somewhat more exacting than under section 1001.
There are a few situations in which the IRS would prefer to
use the perjury statute rather than section 7201 if section 1001 is
165. E.g., United States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1962); Cooper
v. United States, 233 F.2d 821 (8th Cir. 1956).
166. 17 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
167. 168 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1948).
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not available to them. For instance, if the IRS were trying to establish a net worth case against a taxpayer and before the grand
jury the taxpayer alleged his net worth had increased in a certain
year through an inheritance, rather than attempt to establish a
deficiency, it is conceivable that the IRS would find it easier to
prove perjury. Section 1001 would not apply because a grand jury
168
Under secis not a department or agency of the United States.
tion 1621, however, there is no question that there was a valid oath,
materiality, and a false statement. It would not be extremely difficult to obtain the required witnesses to the fact that the will did
not have the requisite bequest. In most cases, however, the two
witness requirement would make section 1621 a more difficult basis
for prosecution by the IRS. 1 9
THE CONSPIRACY STATUTE

The last section of the criminal code which the IRS can utilize to
circumvent the statute of limitations is the conspiracy statute.
Use of the conspiracy statute, section 371, is limited in tax prosecutions, since one of the essential requirements is two or more people.
Section 371 provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any
offense against the United States, or to defraud the United
States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any
purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the
object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed 70the maximum
punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
In some cases, the government may prefer or must prosecute
under section 371 rather than sections 1001 or 7201. Conspiracy requires proof of two elements: (1) an agreement to either (a) commit an offense against or (b) to defraud the United States in any
manner or for any purpose, and (2) an overt act committed by one
168. See United States v. Allen, 193 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
169. In United States v. Laut, 17 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), the government has already attempted to use the perjury statute to convict for

perjury in a conference after the statute of limitations had expired on the
substantive crime. The possible use of the perjury statute to avoid the
criminal tax fraud statute of limitations, if no other means are available,
cannot be ruled out.
170. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964). The maximum possible punishment for
conviction of conspiracy is the same as that for sections 7201 and 1001.
From that aspect, all three are equal.
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or more of the conspirators to effect the object of the conspiracy.171
Although in conspiracy the government must prove an agreement
between two or more people 17 2 to defeat the tax laws, the government need not prove that a substantial deficiency resulted as in
section 7201.173 Thus, for instance, in the situation where the conspirators thought they were evading their taxes and for some reason a deficiency was not created, e.g., when there is a tax loss to be
carried forward, the conspiracy statute is available to the government. Even section 1001 may not be available since the falsity of
the statement may depend on there being a deficiency. The evidence necessary to establish a conviction under section 7201 is the
same as under the conspiracy statute when two people are involved.
The evidence that would be utilized to prove willfulness and the
deficiency would most likely be the same as that used to infer the
agreement in a conspiracy. 7 4 Of course, the affirmative act under section 7201 would be the equivalent of the overt act under
section 371.171
Thus, section 371 proscribes the same conduct as
section 7201, but in the conspiracy prosecution, the IRS does not
have to establish a deficiency.
Purposeand Scope of Statute
The rationale for this statute is built on the assumption that
group action is more dangerous to society than individual action.
From this assumption, the courts conclude that a plan by a group
to commit a criminal offense has more likelihood of being committed because the participants will reinforce each other's deter176
mination to carry out the plan.
Because of the difficulty in determining when the conspiracy
terminates so as to start the statute of limitations running, the
171. E.g., United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940); Anderson v.
United States, 124 F.2d 58 (6th Cir. 1941). See also Ingram v. United
States, 360 U.S. 672 (1959) (co-conspirator not liable unless he knows that
there was liability for taxes due).
172. A husband and wife may be conspirators. United States v. Pege,
364 U.S. 51 (1960). Thus, in any joint return the two person requirement
for a conspiracy violation has been satisfied. See also Mitchell v. United
States, 213 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1954).
173. E.g., United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957); Cooper
v. United States, 9 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1925); Cf. Mitchell v. United States,
213 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1954). See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942).
174. Cf. Cruz v. United States, 106 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1939).
175. Cf. Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960); Grunewald v.
United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); United States v. Kelley, 105 F.2d 912

(2d Cir. 1939).

176. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); United States v.
Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78 (1915). See also, e.g., Woods v. United States, 240
F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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conspiracy statute is often used to prosecute people after the statute
of limitations has run on the substantive offense. Under the normal doctrine, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until
the last overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy is completed. Therefore, whether an act by one of the co-conspirators is
merely an act of concealment or an overt act in furtherance of
conspiracy must be determined to establish the commencement of
177
the statutory period.
To take advantage of this situation, the government has made
two basic arguments to extend the statute of limitations. Although these arguments are illustrated in tax fraud cases, they
have also been used in other criminal cases. 178 The first theory is
that the later acts of furnishing false statements to the Treasury
agents are in furtherance of an actual or implied subsidiary conspiracy to conceal the crime of tax evasion. Consequently, the
false statements are the last overt act from which the statute of
limitations begins to run for this subsidiary conspiracy. The second
argument, which has met with more success, is that the subsequent
false statement is in furtherance of a continuing conspiracy. The
statute of limitations begins to run at the time of that statement.
Both of these arguments were presented to the Supreme Court
in Grunewald v. United States.179 The three defendants were
convicted of conspiracy to defraud the government by "fixing" tax
fraud cases through the use of bribes and improper influence. The
evidence established that in 1947 and 1948 the defendants had procured "no prosecution" rulings in certain tax cases. The rulings
were handed down in 1948 and 1949. In 1951, the conspirators felt
threatened by a House of Representatives investigation and took
steps to hide their traces. The taxpayers were warned to be
quiet, and Grunewald asked his secretary to be silent before a
grand jury in 1952. The Court had to decide whether the indictment, as a matter of law, was barred by the three year statute of
limitations. The government had to prove the conspiracy was in
existence on October 25, 1951, and that at least one overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy was performed after that date.
The defendants contended that the object of the conspiracy
was to obtain "no prosecution" rulings. As these rulings were obtained in October 1948, and January 1949, the criminal object was
obtained, and the conspiracy terminated at that time. Therefore,
177. E.g., Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1959); Grunewald v.
United States, 353 US. 391 (1957); United States v. Johnson, 165 F.2d 42
(3d Cir. 1947).
178. E.g., Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953); Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1959).
179. 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
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the statute of limitations began to run in January 1949, and the
prosecution was barred in 1954, when the indictment was returned.
The government argued that the conspiratorial agreement included a subsidiary agreement to conceal the conspiracy to "fix"
these tax cases. Since the agreement to conceal continued after
the main object of obtaining "no prosecution" rulings had succeeded, overt acts in furtherance of this agreement to conceal were
committed within three years of the indictment. The Court rejected the government's theory not as a matter of law, but because
there was insufficient evidence to establish an express or implied
agreement to conceal the conspiracy after its object was accomplished.18 0 By implication, a subsidiary conspiracy might be found
if established by the evidence. A large quantum of proof would be
required before the statute of limitations could be extended on
this theory.
As an alternate theory in Grunewald, the government suggested that the main objective of the conspiracy was to obtain final
immunity for the taxpayers, not merely to obtain "no prosecution"
rulings. This immunity was not obtained until the statute of limitations expired in 1952 and the conspiratorial agreement continued
until then. Therefore, the acts of concealment in 1951 were overt
acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.
The Court accepted the theory, but remanded so that a jury
could properly determine whether the agreement to conceal was to
protect the taxpayers rather than the conspirators.' 8 1 If the acts of
concealment were merely to protect the conspirators, they were not
done in furtherance of the conspiracy, but were normally expected
of any conspirator. If they were committed as part of the original
prosecution,
agreement to immunize the taxpayers from 8criminal
2
the acts were in furtherance of the conspiracy.1
Theoretically this distinction may be valid, but it is difficult to
determine the true nature of the agreement or the purpose of the
acts. Acts of conealment always protect the conspirators as well as
the taxpayers. This theory would say that the conspirators agreed
to protect the taxpayers until the statute of limitations had expired, but would not have recognized their own self interest and
180. 353 U.S. at 404.
181. Id. at 415.

182. Id. at 408-09.

The Court was obviously troubled by the possi-

bility of indefinite extension of the statute of limitations when it stated:
We cannot accede to the proposition that the duration of a
conspiracy can be indefinitely lengthened merely because the conspiracy is kept secret, and merely because the conspirators take
steps to bury their traces, in order to avoid detection and punishment after the central criminal purpose has been accomplished.
Id. at 405.

Fall 1966]

STATUTES OF LIMITATION

agreed to conceal their crime until the statute of limitations had run.
The Court seemed to feel that conspirators would be likely to enter
into an express agreement to conceal another's crime, but would
act to conceal their own only on the spur of the moment. Logically,the distinction makes sense, but in practice is difficult to apply.
Furthermore, the Court did not here consider the problem of an
indefinite extension of the statute of limitations. Perhaps the
Court was influenced by the fact that the agreement was limited by
the six year statute of limitations. After the statute had run on
the substantive crime, there was no purpose for the conspiratorial
agreement to continue. This theory makes possible a considerable
extension of the statute of limitations. For example, if criminal
tax fraud is committed by two people and they agree to conceal the
crime until the statute of limitations runs, their act just prior to
the expiration of the statutory period will start the six year period
running again on a possible conspiracy prosecution. Prosecution
could be brought up to twelve years from the time of the contemplated crime. Since civil tax fraud has no statute of limitations,
there is no statutory period which will cut off the length of the conspiratorial agreement. Therefore, it is possible that a person, if an
overt act can be found within six years of the indictment, can be
prosecuted for conspiracy at any time.
The theory of continuing conspiracy was again approved in
Forman v. United States.8 3 Defendants had filed timely returns
more than six years prior to the indictment. Certain false records
had been furnished to the IRS within the past six years and these
were relied on as the overt acts of a continuing conspiracy to
evade taxes:
This object was not attained when the tax returns for
1945 ...were filed. As was said in Grunewald, this was
but the first step in the process of evasion. The concealment of the 'holdout' income must continue if the evasion
is to succeed. It must continue until action
8 4 thereon is
barred and the evasion permanently effected.
As explained previously a slight variation in this pleading
could indefinitely extend the statute of. limitations. The government could allege a conspiracy to evade the payment or collection
of -taxes for which there is no statute of limitations. Thus the
Court sanctioned a theory for the indeterminate lengthening of
8
the statute of limitations of which it warned in Grunewald.15
Forman illustrates the difficulty of applying the distinction
expressed in Grunewald between concealing a past completed crime
183.
184.
185.

361 U.S. 416 (1959).
Id. at 423-24.
See supra note 182.
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and concealment as part of a continuing crime. In Forman, the
defendant's actions were as consistent with concealing the conspiracy and crime of "robbing" the pinball machines as it was with
avoiding the payment of taxes.
Now that the Court has endorsed the continuing conspiracy
theory, any wrong move by the taxpayer in a confrontation with
the IRS, regardless of the year in which the taxes were owed, leaves
him open to a charge of conspiracy, provided the government can
find another person with whom the taxpayer may have conspired.
In any of the numerous joint tax returns or returns prepared by
"tax experts" the ingredients for a conspiracy conviction are present.
Although it is not certain, the overt act requirement might be
filled by the mere denial of the conspiracy to evade payment. In
United States v. Klein'1 6 the overt acts alleged were, inter alia, the
affirmation of statements that various defendants had made in
previous hearings to the IRS in prior years which were beyond the
statute of limitations. The jury found that there was no conspiracy to evade income taxes and that no taxes were owing.
Defendants were convicted, however, of a conspiracy to prevent
the Treasury from learning of taxes which were not owed. Thus,
the.government, by calling in a taxpayer and having him affirm
his previous tax return had the overt act necessary for the conspiracy prosecution. The Forman theory of continuing conspiracy
coupled with the theory of the Klein case allows the IRS to prosecute a conspiracy to avoid payment of taxes at any time.
SUMMARY AN

PROPOSALS

Examining the tax system as an integral process, the application and need for these statutes can be critically examined. Since
our system of taxation is established on the practical necessity for
efficient and effective means to collect revenue, a duty is imposed
on our citizens to assess their tax obligation and file a written
statement of the amount owing. Congress has imposed both civil
and criminal sanctions for filing this form with the intent of cheating the government out of the taxes owed. Likewise, sanctions
have been imposed for willful failure to file. When on the subsequent April fifteenth the tax becomes due, the self assessment is
complete. If the taxpayer has completed his obligation faithfully,
the operation is successful. If there has been a willful failure to
file or a filing with the intent to evade, the government has a cause
186.

247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957).
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of action both civilly and criminally against the taxpayer.8 7 Even
though the taxpayer innocently failed to assess himself enough, the
government could proceed to court to recover the amount owed.
Because of the complexity of the tax system, it is recognized
that innocent errors as well as deliberate cheating may cause a
deficiency in the amount returned. Procedures have been established to allow the IRS to consult the taxpayer's records and
books and to require the taxpayer to testify. A direct confrontation of the taxpayer by the IRS occurs in the administrative conference.
This proceeding can serve two functions. The difficulty is
that the character of the proceeding is never certain. It can
either be an administrative proceeding to determine the correct
amount of tax owed with the result that the taxpayer enters into a
binding compromise, or it may serve the function only of obtaining
incriminating evidence to use against the taxpayer in a subse188
quent criminal action.
It must be recognized that the IRS agent is not necessarily an
impartial arbiter like a judge, but may be interested in obtaining a
false statement for prosecution. None of the traditional safeguards
for the possible defendant are present, however. There is no requirement of a warning to the taxpayer of the possibility of criminal prosecution or a statement as to his right to the constitutional
privilege to refuse to answer, or a statement of the purpose of the
proceeding, or presence of counsel, or a deliberate statement such
as would normally be associated with a writing or under oath, or of
a transcript of the proceedings.8 9
187.

INT. REv. CODE of 1954,

§§

6653, 7201.

188. An internal revenue agent, on being questioned concerning the
procedure she followed when fraud was suspected, illustrated the procedure by describing a case in which she was presently involved. Husband
and wife had each filed a separate return, each gave a different home
address than he or she presently had, and both declared six children as his
or her dependents on the separate returns. By independent investigation,
the IRS had established that the husband.and wife were living together at
an address which was not on either's return and they had only -three
children. The.agent's next step was to call the two'taxpayers into her
office by the normal notice,. which states that the tax returns were under
audit. The agent was expected to take extensive notes concerning, the
statements made by the taxpayers and she would interrogate them concerning their address and their children.: Eventually the agent would- ask
for birth certificates for the children.
The agent said that after the interview the whole file would be sent
to a Special Agent for a possible fraud prosecution. The taxpayer, however, would not receive any inkling from the audit agent that it was
already decided that a fraud prosecution would probably be recommended.
Interview with IRS agent in the New Haven Office, April 20, 1964.
189. See supra note 188. See also Cooper v. United States, 233 F.2d
821 (8th Cir. 1956).
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Through this process, the government can put the taxpayer into
a position where he will extend or revive the running of the statute
of limitations. For each one of these crimes of which he may be
convicted, the actual operative facts to prove the crime, other than
his statement, must be those that occurred at the time of the alleged
evasion. Thus, every one of the policies embodied in the statute of
limitations is defeated. The innocent may be convicted because
of the deterioration or destruction of evidence, the judicial process
may be disrupted, the rehabilitated unnecessarily punished, and
the IRS is not required to proceed expeditiously.
When the statute of limitations on section 7201 has run and
the conferee no longer has the use of the fifth amendment privilege
against self incrimination, 190 the "forced" answer either subjects
him to civil penalties or possible criminal prosecution. Not only
does this violate the purposes of the statute of limitations, but it
also distorts the relationship of the state and the citizen, for it
gives the investigator the power to coerce an answer. In spirit if
not in technicality, the taxpayer is entrapped.
To resolve this problem it is proposed that Congress enact a
statute that no indictment for civil or criminal tax fraud or for
conspiracy arising from tax proceedings can be instituted more
than six years after the due date of the tax or the date of the filing
of the last return for that taxable year, whichever is later. If,
however, a criminal proceeding is pending when the statute of limitations expires, the civil proceeding can be instituted within one
rionth of the decision in the criminal case, but the IRS cannot issue
a subpoena to the taxpayer to testify during the interim period.
Enactment of the above provision would give effect to the
policies underlying the need for a civil tax fraud statute of limitations while still allowing the government to utilize its criminal
first-civil later policy. Civil tax fraud would be precluded
from being instituted after six years except when criminal proceedings were in process at the time. Necessarily, in some cases, this
would extend the time for the government to bring its civil action;
however, the taxpayer would receive some forewarning of the possible civil action by the criminal indictment. Moreover, the extension should not be large since the court normally requires the government to prosecute its case expeditiously.
The above enactment would also prevent the IRS from circumventing the six year statute of limitations on criminal tax fraud.
The taxpayer cannot be placed in a position by the IRS of choosing
either to confess or deny fraud because the taxpayer's self-incrimi190. E.g., United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1960);
United States v. Rosen, 174 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1949).
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nation privilege is no longer available when the statute of limitations on criminal tax fraud has expired. Since the government
must have a legitimate purpose to subpoena the taxpayer to a conference,191 the IRS will not have such a purpose after the statute of
limitations runs on civil tax fraud. With the provision that no subpoena can be directed to the taxpayer during the interim between
the criminal and civil case after the statute of limitations has
elapsed, the taxpayer cannot be called into a conference where he is
"forced" to speak. Consequently, the government will not have his
statement to allege as an element of the crimes discussed in this
paper from which the statute of limitations should run.
The prohibition against subpoening the taxpayer during the
interim between the criminal and civil case after the six year period
has expired should not impair the government's preparation for
the subsequent civil case. If the IRS feels it has enough evidence
to proceed to trial in the criminal case, it should not need more evidence prior to the subsequent civil proceeding. New information
uncovered by the criminal trial would often eliminate the need for
civil discovery. When the government fails in the criminal case,
however, it may need more information for the civil case. For
this reason, a complete denial of the subpoena after the criminal
case is completed is not advocated. Only when the statute of limitations expires during the criminal proceeding should the IRS be
precluded from use of the subpoena in the interim before the civil
suit.
The proposed enactment would also bar the government from
bringing any action for conspiracy or tax fraud after six years from
the time the tax was due or when the last return for the taxable
year was filed. By providing that the statute of limitations will
not begin to run until the last tax return for the taxable year is
filed, a full six years is given to the IRS to investigate any late or
amended returns. Thus, the taxpayer is prevented from filing a
correct return to start the statute of limitations running and then
filing a false amended return for refund later with the hope of
obtaining the bar of the statute of limitations before the IRS can
investigate. Although this provision opens the possibility of extension of the statute of limitations by some three years, this extension is within the direct control of the taxpayer since he voluntarily files the amended return. It is not unreasonable to extend
the statutory period when a taxpayer freely commits the act to
make the extension possible; furthermore, this may be the first
notice to the government of possible fraud. This legislation
would also provide a cutoff for institution of an action against the
191.

United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
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taxpayer who willfully fails to file. The period will commence to
run when the tax is legally due; but, if the taxpayer subsequently
files, he will extend the time.
Effect on Criminal Tax Fraudand Willful Failure to File
This proposed legislation does not change the definition of
criminal tax fraud but provides only a concrete time from which
the statute begins to run. If a certain acts violated section 7201
prior to enactment of the proposed statute, these same acts will
still be a violation of 7201; however, subsequent acts, except the
uncoerced act of filing a late return, will not renew or extend the
running of the statute of limitations on criminal tax fraud.
The proposed statute does not violate the purpose encompassed by sections 7201 and 7203. Violation of section 7201 by
defeating or evading taxes is completed when a false return is filed.
Violation of section 7203 by willful failure to file is a completed
offense when, the return has not been filed promptly. At this
point, the self assessment of a person's taxes is finished, albeit unsuccessfully. Should taxpayer later file a false return, he has
again placed himself -in the self assessment system and should be
punished for his attempt to defeat taxes. The proposed enactment will not defeat the protection of the self assessment process
provided by sections 7201 and 7203. From the time that the false
return is filed or the tax due, the government has six years to
bring its action. At this time, sections 7201 and 7203 have completed their functions and any subsequent acts by the taxpayer,
for instance lying in an administrative conference, can be handled
by other statutes which are to protect the tax process once the self
assessment acts have been completed or omitted.
Effect on Conspiracy
This proposal would impose an absolute bar to an indictment
for conspiracy after the six years have expired from the due date
of the tax if no return is filed; and if a return is filed, from the time
of the last filed return. Nevertheless, this enactment will not conflict with the purpose of the conspiracy statute. Only acts prior to
the contemplated crime should be construed to be in furtherance of
the agreement to perpetrate the offense. Even though the conspirators later attempt to conceal their agreement or crime, these
acts are not condemnable within the purpose of the conspiracy
statute. Construing the conspiracy statute so as to include an
agreement to conceal the substantive crime for its period of limitations, in most cases, means that the conspiracy statute is being used
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only to avoid the statute of limitations of the substantive crime,
not to prevent the contemplated crime. Almost every successfully
completed crime depends on secrecy. To hinge the starting of the
statute of limitations for conspiracy on the last overt act which
may be in concealment of the crime creates the possibility that the
period of limitations for conspiracy will be added to the statute of
limitations for the substantive crime. This problem is not peculiar
to the tax field, but exists throughout the criminal field whenever
the government utilizes the conspiracy statute. Its use is even
more onerous in the tax area since the taxpayer can be subpoenaed
to testify by the IRS and put into the position where he will start
the statute running again.
Rather than attempt to resolve the definitional problems of conspiracy, the proposed enactment will protect the statute of limitations by imposing a legal limit on the length of the agreement.
After the statute of limitations has run, there is no purpose for the
agreement. No conspiracy indictment could be returned thereafter.
As with section 7201, this enactment does not affect the definitions
of the crime, but limits institution of the action by the government without violating the purpose of the statute.
Effect on the Administrative Conference
Although this enactment eliminates the use of the administrative conference after the six year period, it is only a partial protection of the statute of limitations since the IRS can hold a conference
just prior to the expiration of the six year statute of limitations.
If any statement is made by the taxpayer, the taxpayer could be
indicted for an offense under sections 1001 or 1621. Criminal tax
fraud and conspiracy charges would not be available to the government after the six year period since the proposed legislation is an
absolute bar which is not affected by subsequent statements.
The problem is not acute for the taxpayer at this stage because
he has an additional option of refusing to answer on the constitutional grounds of possible self-incrimination, rather than admitting
or denying tax fraud. But, as explained previously, this option
also has consequences to the taxpayer which create pressure on
him to answer.

192

Unless the administrative conference is eliminated completely
or radically revised, the taxpayer will have to be exposed to some of
these pressures. If the statutes which are to protect the conference
from falsehoods are repealed, the conferences would have minimal
effect as a source of reliable information. Of course, if a conference
192.

See text accompanying notes 89-91.
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is held within a short period of the year in question, section 7201
and possibly section 371, as presently construed, would be available
to protect the process. But if the conference were held only a short
period before the expiration of the statute of limitations, the taxpayer, knowing that the statute of limitations would expire shortly,
may not feel compelled to tell the truth. Thus some means must
be available to the government to protect this process if it is to be
effectively used. Having such a statute will conflict with the
policies underlying the statute of limitations.
To reconcile this problem completely is impossible, but a more
just balance than the result under the present law can-be reached.
A reasonable compromise would be to repeal the application of section 1001 to tax conferences and enact a modified version of section
1621 to apply to IRS proceedings. This modified statute would be
violated when (1) the taxpayer takes an oath; (2) while under oath
he makes a false statement as to facts which are material to the investigation; (3) the taxpayer believes the statement to be untrue;
and (4) if the statement concerned the underpayment of the taxpayer's own tax liability, it must have been an affirmative and aggressive statement which would normally induce the government
to take affirmative action. In reality, the proposed statute is a combination of the perjury statute and one interpretation of section
1001,193 which serves to protect the taxpayer from unjust con-

victions and circumvention of the six year statute of limitations
on criminal tax fraud, while protecting the function of the administrative conference.
Requiring the taxpayer to be sworn should not create a hardship on the IRS, but it does give the taxpayer a warning that he
should carefully consider the possible consequences
of his statement. The oath will help to prevent the taxpayer from unwittingly
Violating the statute and extending the time for prosecution by
194
ill considered answers.
The purpose of requiring the knowingly false statement to be
material to the investigation would appear to be obvious. If the
statement is immaterial to the investigation, the IRS has no reason to need the answer; and it seems unreasonable to punish a taxpayer for a statement which is of no importance. Thus, the
193. United States v. Paternostro, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962).
194. Other suggestions for the taxpayer's protection may include (1)
requiring the IRS agent to advise the taxpayer of his privilege against
self-incrimination; (2) requiring the IRS to tell the taxpayer he is entitled to a lawyer; or (3) requiring a stenographic record of the hearing;
(4) requiring the agent to state the purpose of the proceeding and make
this a binding election. Elaboration on these possibilities is outside the
scope of this article.
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broad view of section 1001 taken by the Second Circuit would be
precluded. 195 Since the statement need be material only to the investigation, statements which concern the subject matter of the
investigation would be punishable even if given about someone
else's return. Consequently, a deliberately false statement about
items in another person's return would be punishable. The government thereby would be protected from a person hiding someone
else's tax liability with impunity. 196
Finally, the proposed enactment would apply only to situations where the taxpayer makes an affirmative, aggressive statement which would normally induce the government to take affirmative action. The proposed false statement enactment would
not apply when the taxpayer answers questions without actively
asserting other facts. If the taxpayer goes farther than asserting
the truth or falsity of the questions asked so as to actively mislead
the IRS, the statute would apply.
If a taxpayer merely denies criminal acts when questioned by
the government, it seems reprehensible to punish him for those
denials in light of the adversary nature of our criminal process.
To allow the government to prosecute such denials perverts the
accusatorial process into an inquisitorial one. Although it could
be argued that the taxpayer is not forced to answer because of his
fifth amendment privilege, as discussed above this is not an adequate remedy. Moreover, even if the privilege is available, the
taxpayer may not know about it, or may simply be frightened into
denying the accusations. In these situations it is doubtful that the
taxpayer, if he previously attempted to defeat his taxes, should be
punished for any new offense. On the other hand, if the person
attempts to shift the blame elsewhere or to exculpate himself by
asserting new facts, the taxpayer has done fresh acts which, if
false, should be prosecuted, especially if they would tend to mislead the government. Having the requirement that the statement
normally induce the government to take affirmative action provides
protection for the taxpayer, but does not sacrifice the efficacy of
the administrative conference. If the government could not be
misled, what harm has resulted? Punishment would then be only
for the sake of punishing a false statement which has no harmful
effects.
If the taxpayer is not subject to criminal liability, there is no
need to protect him by requiring that the statement be affirmative
and aggressive. His act would not be such as to cover up past
195.
196.

See text accompanying notes 130 to 138.
Compare Poonian v. United States, 294 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1961),

discussed in text accompanying notes 149-152.
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criminal liability. Any statement he normally would make would
not have any relationship to the policies involving the statute of
limitations; and it may not be too much to require a person to be
honest with government investigators. One exceptional situation
would be where a criminal tax fraud proceeding has terminated
and the taxpayer is successful, but the six year period has not run.
Arguably, the taxpayer could be liable for civil tax fraud penalties,
but not criminal tax fraud because of double jeopardy. Therefore,
he could be required to answer and not have the protection of the
self-incrimination clause or possibly the statute. This problem
need not detain us long since there are other crimes outlined in the
tax code and general criminal statutes for which he could be prosecuted. Thus, the self-incrimination clause and the proposed enactment would protect him.
CONCLUSION

The enactments suggested are really compromises between competing policies. No proposal could resolve all of the problems so as
to fully satisfy every policy consideration. Some policies underlying the statute of limitations must bow to the needs of the tax enforcement system and those which give the most protection to the
tax system must give way for the protection of the taxpayer.
There is some room for abuse on each side, but the greatest possibility of abuse remains with the government through the use of
the proposed false statement statute for tax proceedings. The best
preventative for such misuse is responsible, capable administrators
who are sensitive to the demands of justice.

